The July 15 coup attempt is a turning point in Turkish domestic and foreign policy. It was not an ordinary event but a crucial turning point affecting not only Turkish domestic politics but also Turkish foreign policy. Considering its impact on foreign policy, July 15 can be examined in two different contexts: regional and global. Below, I will first briefly explain the impact of Turkish domestic politics. Then I will analyze its impact on Turkish foreign policy, focusing on regional and global scales.
The post-coup-attempt period presented a historic opportunity for the restructuring of the state, and this opportunity was seized, leading to the restructuring of both state institutions and the country’s domestic and foreign policies. The failed coup attempt made a significant contribution to the restructuring of Türkiye’s domestic politics. The effectiveness of state institutions, especially security institutions, has increased significantly.
After the coup attempt, state institutions and the administrative structure were largely restructured. The administrative system was changed, transitioning to a presidential system. The political system in Türkiye was fundamentally altered; a presidential system was introduced. Accordingly, almost all state institutions were restructured; civilian politics was strengthened. With the strengthening of civilian politics, the tutelage regime was ended. Elected politicians consolidated their power against the appointed bureaucrats. The likelihood of a coup in Türkiye will be much lower once state institutions begin to perform their primary duties.
The mentality of state institutions in our country, especially security institutions, has changed. After the coup attempt, with the purging of elements working in favor of foreign actors (serving the interests of others), state institutions have truly transformed into national institutions. There has been a significant increase in the capacity and capabilities of security institutions. With the impact of developments in the defense industry, security institutions have become capable of conducting successful operations abroad. State institutions have truly transformed into national institutions that fulfill the interests of Türkiye. For example, just one month after the coup attempt, the Turkish Armed Forces carried out a very successful military operation in northern Syria.
Following July 15, Türkiye underwent a significant restructuring of its foreign policy. First, dependence on the West largely ended, and the search for strategic autonomy accelerated. Instead of a dependent relationship, an Ankara-centric, independent foreign policy approach was adopted. Relations with the West began to be conducted on a horizontal level, as a relationship and partnership between equals. Western states, insistent on not speaking this new language, further excluded, marginalized and even demonized Türkiye. Western states began to openly support all anti-Türkiye terrorist organizations and structures, primarily the PKK/YPG and the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ). They continuously provided all kinds of financial and military support to anti-Türkiye actors in the Syrian and Libyan crises. As a reaction to this otherization of Türkiye, a supra-party anti-Western sentiment has also risen in the country.
Second, Türkiye began to take initiatives in foreign policy with a high level of self-confidence unprecedented in its history. For instance, it has developed a strategy of confronting threats externally. Türkiye began to confront and prevent threats to its territorial integrity and political independence through military operations conducted beyond its borders. In this context, four successful military operations were carried out against Daesh and PKK/YPG in northern Syria. On the other hand, it has managed to break the policy of containment directed against it in the Eastern Mediterranean by signing two memoranda of understanding with the Libyan government. Third, Türkiye diversified its foreign policy partners as dictated by its own interests and developed relations with non-Western actors. As Türkiye became more isolated by the Western states, it placed much greater emphasis on its defense industry, embarking on a path to becoming a major military power.
Fourth, Türkiye’s hard and soft power increased. It made significant strides in the defense industry and developed a security-centered foreign policy approach. As a result, it increased both its offensive and defensive capabilities and reinforced its diplomatic power with military strength. Türkiye gained the appreciation of non-Western actors, states and peoples. Türkiye, seeking a new status, increased its ongoing foreign aid efforts. The aid provided to countries like Somalia, Qatar and Libya is a highly strategic move. Türkiye, with its increasing hard and soft power, finds itself isolated due to its Ankara-centric policies. For example, it was all alone during the Libyan crisis and managed to defeat the actor supported by numerous global and regional powers. Furthermore, its power has made it a deterrent force.
Fifth, Türkiye began to conduct and behave like a global player. Türkiye became one of the most important countries and actors in the power struggle between major powers. Those who know that losing Türkiye would be costly are in favor of cooperating with Ankara. Some Western and many non-Western countries want to win over a country like Türkiye, which has the potential to shift the balance of power.
July 15 is a link in the chain of events aimed at turning the Arab Spring into a winter. Some global and regional powers tried to make Türkiye pay the price for its support of the Arab Spring (uprisings and revolutions). In fact, the first attempt in this sense against Türkiye occurred in 2013 with the Gezi protests. During the same period, there was a violent military coup in Egypt. The government was overthrown in Ukraine, and the country was fragmented. Those who planned July 15 were the same as those who supported the Haftar military coup attempt in Libya in 2014. That is, July 15 was also a coup attempt aimed at preventing the will of the people in the Middle East from being reflected in the government.
The goal was to remove Türkiye from being a model and a source of hope for Muslim peoples in the region, especially the Arab peoples who constitute most of the region and whose regimes are entirely dependent on the West. With its functioning democracy, growing economy, and established state institutions, Türkiye has been targeted for transforming into a regime that would not influence the politically aware Arab populations.
After the failure of the July 15 coup attempt, a regional containment policy was implemented against Türkiye. Operations were carried out, and projects were developed against Türkiye’s domestic and foreign politics through anti-Turkish regional actors. However, after the steps taken by Türkiye in security issues, these projects, which were being carried out through non-state actors such as PKK/YPG and FETÖ and/or countries such as Israel, the UAE and Greece, were disrupted. Over the past decade, Türkiye has managed to survive against all these opposing policies. Considering its effective interventions in regional crises after the July 15 coup attempt, it is understood that the following developments reveal Turkey's increasing effectiveness.
For one thing, Türkiye carried out four successful military operations against the Syrian crisis, the first of which was right after the coup attempt. Operation Euphrates Shield was carried out against Daesh in August 2016, Operation Olive Branch against PKK/YPG in northwestern Syria in January 2018, Operation Peace Spring against PKK/YPG in northeastern Syria in October 2019, and Operation Spring Shield against the Assad regime in Idlib in February 2020. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) were effective in all of them.
Furthermore, Türkiye effectively intervened in the Qatar-centered Gulf crisis in 2017 and ensured that Qatar did not bow to other Gulf states. Similarly, Türkiye effectively intervened in the Libyan crisis in 2020, preventing the capital, Tripoli, from falling into the hands of Khalifa Haftar, who had the support of many regional and global actors, and ensured that the legitimate government in the country continued to exist by strengthening its presence. Finally, Türkiye’s military support to Azerbaijan in Karabakh in 2021, which liberated Azerbaijani territories from the Armenian occupation, demonstrates the effectiveness of Türkiye’s regional role.
All in all, after the failed July 15 coup attempt, the Turkish people increased their political awareness. From now on, it will be relatively much more difficult to carry out political operations against the Turkish people. The people have learned that the state and the homeland belong to them and that they must first and foremost protect them. Ultimately, guarding the homeland is the duty of every Turkish citizen. Under these new realities, Turkish domestic and foreign policy was largely restructured, and the Turkish state gained a high level of confidence in the execution of foreign policy.
