Türkiye’s extended hand for normalization represented an opportunity for the Bashar Assad regime. Starting in the early months of 2023, Türkiye demonstrated its determination on this issue. Ensuring territorial integrity, clearing terrorism, enabling the return of refugees and ultimately establishing an inclusive and stable administration in Syria – without excluding the regime – offered Assad a viable way out.
On Nov. 12, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told reporters on his return from Azerbaijan: “I still hope we can come together and put Syria-Türkiye relations on track. We believe normalization will pave the way for peace and tranquility in Syrian territories.” He also issued a warning: “It must not be forgotten that the fire in unstable regions spreads rapidly.”
Assad initially dragged his feet, imposing preconditions on Türkiye’s proposal. While Russia played a more constructive role in the early stages of normalization efforts, it later failed to sufficiently encourage the regime. Meanwhile, Iran adopted an obstructive stance, pushing for mechanisms that included itself and discouraging Assad from coming to the table.
Assad’s growing engagement with Gulf countries and other nations, his invitations to international summits and his perception of having regained substantial control in Syria contributed to his reluctance toward normalization.
As a result, Assad squandered two years on normalization. During this period, Israel’s systematic oppression of Palestinians exacerbated regional instability, and it was evident that Syria would be the most affected by the ensuing crises and turbulence.
Iran had to relocate many of its militias from Syria to Lebanon, leading to vulnerabilities, particularly in command structures. Russia, fully focused on the Ukraine war, could no longer provide the regime with the level of support it once did.
Meanwhile, during the relative lull in conflict, Syrian opposition forces strengthened in terms of training, equipment and field preparedness, whereas the regime suffered from a decline in troop numbers, capacity, and economic stability.
Despite these realities, the opposition's swift takeover of Aleppo and subsequent moves toward Hama were unexpected. In the current situation, these developments have created a new reality on the ground after 13 years of civil war. This new reality will impact all structures, actors and forces operating in Syria, including the regime.
Türkiye has officially stated that it “has not been involved in the clashes.” Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan declared, “We will not take any actions that might trigger a new wave of migration.”
Türkiye’s stance on Syria’s future remains clear. Based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254, it advocates for the adoption of an inclusive constitution, free elections, a secure environment, the safe return of refugees and a joint fight against terrorist threats to Türkiye.
The new reality on the ground does not change Türkiye’s principled position. However, it is expected that Türkiye will intensify its diplomatic efforts to accelerate steps toward resolution, deploy new tools and shorten the processes leading to a political solution.
The current situation in Syria presents both a risk of deepening existing crises and conflicts and an opportunity to expedite the path toward a political resolution. Actors with a vested interest in ongoing instability will likely attempt to block political solutions.
Israel has been the country to benefit most from the Syrian civil war. The stance of the new U.S. administration will likely align with Israel’s interests. Iran's focus on maintaining its presence in Syria currently shows little potential for playing a constructive role in political solutions that include the opposition.
Amid this reality, the Assad regime still has an opportunity. Responding positively to Türkiye’s normalization efforts and initiating a new negotiation process that includes the opposition is the most rational model for achieving a political solution. Once negotiations begin at the table, progress can be made by filling the gaps in the field through dialogue. Russia’s position on the regime’s attitude will be critical in this regard.
