Continuing from my latest article, I would now like to address another point: the relationship between piety and expectation. More specifically, I want to examine whether expecting something from God can be understood as an expectation that turns worship into commerce, as Socrates suggests. Socrates’ critique of traditional Athenian religiosity, which served as the starting point for this series of articles, ultimately leads us to this question. To recall, he characterizes the religious attitude of those who perform sacrifices and then demand something in return from the gods as a kind of trade. If the relationship between sacrifice and petitionary prayer is conceived as one of causality, is there any other way to describe it besides commerce?
When the ruler said to the Chinese sage who had traveled a great distance to visit him, “Since you have taken such trouble, you must have brought us something useful,” the sage replied, “If you encourage people to do only what is useful, they will learn merely to pursue their own interests.”
What do the words of the sage mean to a person whose mind is conditioned to think in terms of the ability to obtain what is helpful for the individual or society? Undoubtedly, the sage points to the possibility that humans may have a capacity superior to utilitarian reason, drawing our attention to our ability to engage with what lies behind what is useful.
Such is precisely the capacity pursued by metaphysicians and, in the Islamic tradition, by Sufis. Understanding the nature of such a capacity, which is considered to lie beyond the mind conditioned by the hardships of life, is difficult, at least from where we currently stand. However, such a capacity, if it exists, opens up the possibility of establishing a different relationship that transcends the relationship between existence and benefit and harm.
The basis of this relationship still rests on the principles of beauty, goodness and truth, which we assume even the “utilitarian” mind recognizes. The capacity that underlies utilitarian reasoning seeks a way to transcend the horizon narrowed, or even distorted, by human experience, by contemplating what is good, faithful and beautiful in itself. In doing so, it becomes capable of metaphysical thought. The aim of ancient metaphysics was precisely to contemplate and comprehend such beauty, goodness and truth. Even if we grant that this capacity appeared only in exceptional individuals, it remains certain that, for most people, reason continues to view the world through the lens of profit and loss, reducing even the ideal to something merely useful.
Expecting something in return for one's actions, even feeling a sense of peace of mind, tranquility and the confidence that comes from benefiting others, is incompatible with sincerity, which is the purest form of intention in religion; this is clear. All this makes worship a part of the human psychological world, compelling it to remain in a state of expectation. However, sincerity means performing acts of worship solely for God, free from expectations. But is it not the condition of being “for God” an expectation in itself? Although such a question may seem meaningful to many people in the modern world, in the history of religious thought, only Sufis formulated the question in this way.
When they analyzed the dimensions of expectation in their discussions of sincerity, they also considered whether asking something of God, whether in return for something or without return, as Socrates said, would compromise sincerity. Sufism elevated expectationlessness to a serious issue in religious life, raising the question: If there is to be a reward and expectation in our relationship with God, in this world or the hereafter, is it possible to distinguish this from commerce?
This question is not easily answered. Many verses of the Quran and hadiths describe piety as a reciprocal relationship between God and humanity, in which “rewards” are granted for the deeds of believers. The frequent mention of “punishment” in the sacred texts underscores this principle. Even if the purpose of worship is ultimately to seek divine pleasure, the outcome is still framed as paradise for the righteous and hell for sinners. Despite this seemingly straightforward explanation, a serious debate has emerged within Islam: Does a person have the right to expect a reward from God for their deeds, or not?
Sufis were the most explicit on this matter: "expecting," even if it is from God, and especially waiting in return for worship, is not a behavior worthy of the God-human relationship. Poems expressing the desire not to crave the blessings of paradise illustrate this. The concept of "love" became central to Sufi life; this was to overcome this expectation, to think of the relationship between man and God beyond all interests and benefits.
However, even more important than this was the approach of the "Ahl al-Sunnah," which constituted the mainstream interpretation of Islam, at least in its rejection of "deserving." For them, it is right to expect something from God, but to think of this as a "reward" is contrary to the spirit of worship. This approach transcends the "reward-punishment" based piety formulated by the Mu'tazila and considers submission to God's grace and will to be the spirit of religion.
Undoubtedly, this approach cannot be considered a sufficient response to Socrates' criticism, but at least the mainstream within Islam's rejection of entitlement and its centrality of grace and mercy in religious life is a noteworthy critique. Then, even if sacrifices, which can be seen as a common feature of all worship, are offered to God, the relationship between demand-prayer and sacrifice is not one of necessity.
It is clear that this approach is, to some extent, "revolutionary"; it means that humans establish a relationship with God at a higher level by stepping outside the behavior they have traditionally adopted. It is "revolutionary" because the attitude this thought seeks to overcome is the selfishness in the "commercial" relationship that humans establish with the world and God, as conceptualized by the Mu'tazila.
Before the thought expressed by the Mu'tazila became a theory, it was the very behavior that had become apparent in human relationships with God and other humans. The Mu'tazilites reduced religion to the level of human habit by equating the instinct that guides human behavior with piety they neglected the fundamentally transformative aspect of religion in human consciousness. By establishing a necessary link between religion and life, between religion and experience, it brought religious life within the normal limits of life. It is believed to have established a connection between "reason" and religion. However, it should have sought to discover the limits of cognition through a thorough critique of reason and human experience, thereby laying the basis for a more transformative relationship between religion and humanity.
The Sunnis, on the other hand, with a relatively revolutionary attitude, infused the essence of religious life with divine grace; even if this had some harmful consequences in practice, it laid the foundation for conceiving piety as a miraculous event. Piety itself was a miracle, faith itself was a blessing, and worship was an eternal relationship between the Transcendent and humanity, established by the Transcendent. It was up to humans to recognize this relationship and, beyond psychological and social habits, to realize their existence in true communion with God. This is what it means to say, “He who knows Allah, knows himself.”
