What we know for sure about a Trump world is that the next four years will not be better. What we cannot be sure of is whether it will be worse. Trump’s foreign policy and security team is a perfect example of the former. Almost all of them are staunch defenders of Trumpism and MAGA (Make America Great Again). MAGA 1.0, which symbolized Trump’s first term, was shaped by examples of hyper-realism, a bad imitation of realist foreign policy. MAGA 1.0 did not consolidate U.S. global leadership, and Trump’s “America First” slogan did not work very well.
Trump failed to fix the problems of the American economy, failed to put the U.S. ahead in the global power competition and failed to contain Russia and China. He has been patronizing in his relations with the Global South and has tried to make the demands of rising powers part of purely American pragmatism.
Another sign that we are not going to see a better world is that Trump’s team has an ultra-hawkish outlook that distinguishes it from the traditional neo-conservative line. Pete Hegseth, the nominee for Secretary of Defense, has a career outside the conventional American security and defense bureaucracy and is a staunch Zionist. Marco Rubio, nominated for Secretary of State, is a hard-line hawk with no experience in international diplomacy. Trump’s team is far removed from the military deterrence of conservative internationalism that has traditionally characterized Republican foreign policy and represents a populist security policy. Representatives of foreign and security policy, including Trump, believe that sanctions and the threat of military force will produce more results.
Another characteristic of Trump’s team is that almost all of them are pro-Israel Zionists. Hegseth is a religious Zionist and believes that “Zionism and Americanism are the front lines for Western Civilization and Freedom.” Rubio openly supports Israel’s actions in Gaza, while Mike Waltz, the nominee for National Security Advisor, believes that the U.S. should give Israel a blank check. Other members of Trump’s team are in line with these views. Potentially, they all have the mindsets to serve Trump’s madman theory of world politics.
Under the Trump administration, the more important issue is not what the U.S. will do but how the rest of the world will act in response. This makes it imperative to analyze the structural elements of foreign policy instead of focusing on individual profiles and to consider that foreign policy is made through reciprocal interaction.
The Israeli issue represents one of the first challenges for the Trump administration. The fact that Trump’s foreign policy and security team is pro-Israel is an important variable, but it does not mean that the U.S. has unlimited alternatives. Israel is not winning the so-called war of self-defense and is trying to take steps that will cause greater regional instability. Completely dehumanizing Gaza, annexing the West Bank and occupying southern Lebanon are among the goals that cannot be achieved even with Trump’s pro-Israel team giving Israel carte blanche. On the other hand, neutralizing Iran’s proxies in Syria and weakening Iran are among the goals that cannot be achieved with blind U.S. support for Israel. Preventing regional conflict requires strategic coordination with the countries of the region and places more responsibility on the U.S. Working effectively with Türkiye, Egypt and the Gulf countries in the new era depends on Israel stopping the Gaza war and abandoning its revisionist policies. More support for Israel will not bring more stability and could lead to another four chaotic years for the U.S. in the region. Unlimited support for Israel means Israel’s isolation from the region and the international system, and the United States’ condemnation of an Israel-oriented Middle East policy.
The limits of the U.S. are not restricted to Israel. Iran may be weakening, but its capacity to foster regional conflict is not disappearing. More importantly, forcing a change of policy through military means without addressing Iran’s nuclear program only pushes Iran toward more belligerent policies, makes the Gulf states more vulnerable and deepens regional instability. Realistic and effective policymaking toward Iran still requires building options to return to nuclear negotiations and forming a regional consensus. More sanctions and a greater show of force strengthen Iran rather than weaken it.
One of the Trump administration’s most challenging dossiers, Russia, is critical for its strategic and systemic implications. Russia is not losing the war in Ukraine and, contrary to popular belief, does not seem ready for a cease-fire. In addition, the Trump administration’s reluctance to finance the Ukrainian war further strengthens Russia’s hand and puts Europe in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis Russia. The only way to build a peace plan based on a broader consensus is to revisit the Ukrainian crisis on terms acceptable to Russia. The Trump administration needs to work on more serious options for a new settlement that would allow Russia to withdraw from Ukrainian territory. Trump’s transactional foreign policy, based on military deterrence, is unlikely to end the war in Ukraine. Ending the war by sacrificing Ukraine’s territorial integrity could cost Trump strategically, such as the loss of Europe and the weakening of NATO, while opening up new strategic opportunities for his rivals in the global system.
China is among Trump’s top foreign policy priorities. However, the Trump administration’s foreign policy team’s oversimplified approach to China could make the China problem, which has become increasingly complex since the Obama era, even more critical. Rather than solving Trump’s domestic economic crisis, squeezing China economically may only exacerbate it and make it impossible for Trump to fulfill his economic promises. Maximum pressure and isolation against China could undermine Trump’s global leadership of the United States and lead to China gaining new allies. More importantly, it could fuel a global economic crisis and result in weak and fragile economies turning more toward China.
Another issue that is less about what the U.S. will do and more about how it will respond is Turkish-American relations. If the Trump administration is to design a foreign policy in which military deterrence and geopolitics will be more important, it must also consider the foreign policy priorities of emerging actors like Türkiye. Russia, the Middle East and China offer new opportunities for Turkish-American relations. When it comes to Russia, Türkiye seems to have a useful portfolio. In the Middle East, ignoring Türkiye’s priorities in Syria and continuing to jeopardize Ankara’s national security by making a radical shift about the YPG would undermine Turkish-American relations. Only strategic coordination with regional actors such as Türkiye can balance Iran and return it to the path of a reasonable nation-state. Iraq’s stability and the strategic adaptation of the Gulf states can only be achieved with a reasonable U.S. Middle East strategy.
In conclusion, it is not only the U.S. but also the behavior of other countries that will determine what the Trump world will look like. To avoid a worse four years, Trump should adopt a cooperative foreign policy and security approach that recognizes the limits of the U.S.
