U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth seems to have interrupted the dogmatic slumbers of the political class in Europe by “introducing realism to the conversation” when he finally spelled out, for example, the reality that “Ukraine membership in NATO as part of a negotiated settlement is unlikely.” Many European leaders were disappointed to discover that reality, of course, and they did not shy away from expressing their disappointment vocally. It was almost as if they had some agency at last, albeit manifested in the form of passive aggressive resistance against the empire’s unconditional and seemingly inconsistent demands. For instance, Germany’s President Frank-Walter Steinmeier complained about a difference in worldviews between Europe and America, accusing the latter of having “no regard for established rules, established partnerships and trust.” He was “concerned” about another, yet more devastating, reality that “a small entrepreneurial elite has the power, the means and the will to redefine a significant part of the rules of liberal democracy.”
Considering that Germany has not shown a particularly high regard for “the rule of law” with respect to Israel’s ongoing war crimes, it is not easy to figure out what set of rules Steinmeier had in mind when he raised these concerns. In any case, these rules seem to be absolutely essential for Europe’s survival, whatever their nature may be. In fact, echoing Steinmeier, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned that “without norms and standards, one may be at the table yesterday, but end up on the menu tomorrow,” clearly alluding to the current American attitude toward Ukraine and Europe more broadly. Indeed, U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s bold speech at the Munich Security Conference, coupled with Hegseth’s earlier remarks, was really the perfect illustration of Europe’s downfall from “being at the table” to “being on the menu.”
From German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s “rejection” of Vance’s tacit support for the likes of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, to Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s call for a uniquely European “plan of action” regarding Ukraine and Europe’s security, the last week saw a collective opposition to U.S. President Donald Trump’s emerging global agenda. Even the leader of the Conservative Party in Canada, Pierre Poilievre, who is otherwise extremely fond of the MAGA movement in the U.S., joined in the opposition and maintained a strong anti-Russia stance in response to Trump’s suggestion that Russia could be welcomed back to the G-7 (formerly G-8). Yet, verbal opposition aside, is there a concrete strategy that Europe could pursue in these circumstances?
It is instructive in this connection to take a look at how French President Emmanuel Macron recently reacted to Trump’s allegation that Europe has been “unfair” to the U.S. in trade. Macron reminded Trump that he ought to focus on China instead, as though the emperor did not have his priorities straight. What was especially striking about this reminder was really Macron’s unnecessarily antagonizing China, the only power that Europe could cooperate with in order to push back against the pressures of the current administration of the U.S. Of course, any meaningful cooperation with China in this way would be unimaginable for European liberals, perhaps even more so than caving in humiliation to Trump’s aggressive demands.
What Macron’s reflexive anti-China stance reveals about the political class in Europe is that they remain more comfortable playing the role of moral sentinels than strategic actors. It is doubtless easier to gesture toward a vague commitment to “liberal values” than to acknowledge the structural constraints that leave Europe in an increasingly precarious, and frankly foolish, position; but when European leaders issue their perfunctory condemnations of Trump’s unilateralism or Vance’s revisionism, do they actually expect such gestures to amount to anything beyond a temporary display of indignation? And if they do, one is left to wonder whether they truly believe in the efficacy of their own rhetoric, or if they are simply performing for domestic audiences who have long grown accustomed to the fiction of European agency.
The question is this: What, if anything, could Europe offer as a viable alternative to the course being set by Washington? If Macron’s example is any indication, then the answer might very well be – nothing. Despite all the lamentations about Trump’s trade policies, Hegseth’s blunt realism, or Vance’s offensive lecture on “free speech,” Europe’s response is neither unity nor strategy but rather an incoherent mix of resistance and submission. Thus, for all the performative outrage and rhetorical flourishes, the reality is much simpler: Europe may resent being on the menu, but it has yet to demonstrate any ability or will to leave the table.
