With the removal of the Assad regime, the new Syrian administration has faced numerous challenges. In addition to international recognition, sanctions, poverty and infrastructure problems, the country also struggles with internal security issues. These issues can be categorized into three main groups, namely, remnants of the regime, Druze armed groups and PKK/YPG.
With the end of Baath rule in the country, a group consisting of former army or militia elements, many of whom are considered war criminals, has emerged. It can be stated that these individuals have lost their power and are also in economic distress. Although their salaries from the state were not their main source of income, they have now been cut off, leaving them unemployed. Consequently, they are inclined toward terrorism, particularly under Iranian influence.
Furthermore, in addition to military elements, there was also a group within the civil bureaucracy or those benefiting from the regime's economic privileges. It can be supposed that if these elements choose to engage in terrorist activities instead of adapting to the new order, they could pose a security threat. However, experiences since 2011 suggest that most of them have died within the regime’s army, and the Alawite community is likely to seek reconciliation with the new administration to preserve its existence. Moreover, the ideological motivation for terrorism is not beyond the greed for power. As a result, it can be said that regime remnants should not be considered a long-term security threat to the new administration.
Druze armed groups can be classified as a low-risk element in the hierarchy of potential security threats faced by the Damascus administration. The continuous protests against the Assad regime, coupled with intelligence-level contacts with Israel, have led some Druze factions to pursue alternative ambitions. Nevertheless, it is not meant that all Druze are in favor of collaboration with Israel. There have been protests against both Israel and its Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. It is known that Hikmat al-Hijri, the most prominent Druze religious leader, maintains a distant stance toward the Damascus administration while keeping in contact with Israel. Due to this, no formal agreement has yet been reached between the Damascus administration and, foremost, Druze leaders or armed groups. However, Druze Amjad Badr's being chosen as the Agriculture Minister in Syria's new government is a noteworthy development.
It is important to note that the Damascus administration is open to reconciliation and has shown sincerity in integrating Druze leaders into the governance of Sweida province. Additionally, any Israel-backed initiative has a very low chance of gaining social legitimacy in the Arab world. Thus, it can be stated if the Druze community seeks to secure a status in Syria through cooperation with Israel, it will likely face an internal backlash and widespread societal outrage.
The PKK/YPG constitutes the highest threat level in the hierarchy of internal security threats facing the Damascus administration. However, with the fall of the regime, the political and military landscape has shifted entirely against the PKK/YPG. As a result of this shift and U.S. pressure, an agreement – described as a "framework agreement" – has emerged between the Damascus administration and YPG.
If we examine the details of this agreement, Ferhat Abdi Şahin, codenamed "Mazloum Kobani" and also presumably now known as "Mazloum Abdi," one of the signatories, was not referred to as "general" or "commander-in-chief" but simply as "Mr. Mazloum Abdi." The only flag displayed during the signing ceremony was the Syrian flag, with no representation of the YPG or the so-called autonomous administration.
Nonetheless, while the agreement appears to favor the Damascus administration on paper, the PKK/YPG continues to resist on the ground, increasing pressure on those aligned with Damascus. Numerous individuals have been detained. Although committees have begun preparatory meetings for the implementation of the agreement, it can be said that in the area, adverse developments continue to occur. Therefore, a stance of "cautious optimism" is the most reasonable approach to this agreement.
Beyond the agreement, there are three key factors suggesting that PKK/YPG’s long-term presence in Syria is unsustainable:
Türkiye has gained its most advantageous position in the context of the military balance in Syria since the beginning of the uprising against the PKK/YPG. With a pro-Turkish government in Damascus, the Assad regime, which provided a political foundation for ethnic minorities' opposition and used the PKK/YPG as a tool, has been eliminated.
According to a recent study by Ömer Özkızılcık, which was published by the Atlantic Council, the Kurdish population within the borders of the so-called autonomous administration is, at best, 19%. Cities such as Deir ez-Zor, Tabqa, Raqqa, Ain Issa and the urban centers of Hasakah are almost entirely Arab. The Arab population in these areas prefers to live under the Damascus administration. In fact, celebrations took place in these cities on the night of the agreement.
Donald Trump plans to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria and is one of the key political figures who best understands Türkiye’s role in Syria. At the same time, it is stated in the agreement with Damascus that the United States is the element that puts pressure on the YPG and that the situation in question is part of a process aimed at withdrawing from Syria.
In conclusion, the security threats faced by the Damascus administration appear manageable. In this regard, Türkiye is taking steps to support the Damascus administration and can actually participate in the field regarding the PKK/YPG file, which can be considered the most significant security threat. The field reports indicate that even security operations against regime remnants are being conducted in cooperation with the New Syrian Army and Türkiye.
