Former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, who remains at large despite an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) nearly two years ago, argues in his latest article against what he describes as the “gradual entrenchment” of Türkiye in Syria. He compares it with the “Iranian penetration” in Lebanon, which, he maintains, developed because at the time Israel failed to take the threat seriously enough. This time, however, he warns his fellow Israelis that the threat must be taken very seriously. “We cannot allow a military establishment so close that it degrades our ability to defend ourselves against Iran, against Lebanon, and against Syria itself,” he says.
Gallant’s entire thinking is based on a simple military doctrine: that Israel must have the “qualitative military edge” to ensure that it is essentially the most powerful country in its region. The mere possibility that another country could rival Israel militarily is anathema to this thinking, for it assumes that Israel would have to “defend itself” if that other country ever challenged its power, even if only theoretically. And on this assumption, it makes policy decisions and continually acts on them. Yet this, ironically, demonstrates quite dramatically that Israel is itself what it claims to fear.
Gallant’s article is perhaps not very informative, but it is certainly interesting. It is interesting both for revealing how he, as a senior figure in what may be called the “Israeli establishment,” for lack of a better term, perceives the world through what he takes to be the perspective of “Israeli interests,” and for articulating the manner in which Israel usually cooperates with others.
After making several observations regarding Türkiye’s influence in Syria as he interprets it, Gallant cautions that “a Syrian army rebuilt with Turkish systems, by Turkish trainers, is a Syrian army that answers in some measure to Ankara.” Instead, Israel must see to it that it answers “in some measure” to Tel Aviv. In fact, this is precisely what Gallant is telling those friendly countries which he praises for “partnering with Israel, not against it” to do without objection. It is a strategy that apparently “has already been proven as a far more productive route.”
Gallant’s worldview is noteworthy, not least as an illustration of what “productive routes” in international relations are supposed to look like within the rules-based international order. Of course, his worldview is contested by many, including some in Israel, though not always for the right reasons. The right reasons would include, for example, the complete rejection of the notion that Israel gets to decide which particular routes may be productive, especially in view of the fact that its preferred routes have led to so much destruction in its region over the decades.
Gallant’s regret that Israel’s relations with Türkiye are not what they used to be, which is not really because Türkiye has become particularly adversarial toward Israel, as he complains, but because Israel has come to view Türkiye as a challenger, is only as genuine as his regret over the civilian deaths in Gaza. It cannot be genuine because it is expressed against the background of a military doctrine that demands absolute superiority. What Gallant regrets, then, could only be that this absolute superiority is at risk today, and that there is no easy way to secure it in the long run either. It is thus with desperation that he urges Israeli leaders to “address the foothold while it is still being built and build the fourth circle while there is time to build it.”
Given the substance of the discussions about Israel’s poorly defined “right to defend itself,” it was always to be expected that this right would eventually be extended to justify Israel’s preemptive actions against the theoretical threat that others may be able to respond to the very tangible threat that it has posed to them, arguably ever since its inception as a state. “Partnering with Israel, not against it” requires, therefore, remaining vulnerable to it.
