At this year's Munich Security Conference, the focus was on change in global order and the multipolar transformation of the international system. However, the outbursts of the U.S. officials against European allies and their radical solutions for the end of the war in Ukraine shifted the focus. In other words, Europe's liberal actors were the subject of criticism and marginalization at the events they hosted, especially on vital issues.
In fact, the pre-conference report partly anticipated all these developments and acknowledged that the liberal hegemony after the end of the Cold War had been severely challenged, not only in terms of the global order or the international system but also in terms of ideology. In other words, multipolarity has become a powerful ideological trend.
It could be said that this is both a correct observation and a belated admission. The discourse and rules developed by liberal democracy through international institutions and values have long been insufficient to convince societies. Liberal ideology is becoming less dominant in non-Western countries, at least in terms of overall perception.
On the other hand, the West has, for some time, preferred to underestimate rather than understand the waves of anti-liberalism coming from “outside” and maintain its discourse and approach based on so-called moral superiority. It has labeled all outsiders as populist and/or authoritarian. But these “anti-establishment” actors, who managed to get the support of voters who responded to parties and policies that defined themselves as “centrist,” whether traditional or right-wing, managed to come to power in the U.S. and Europe, the patrons and “exporters” of liberal ideology.
In fact, this was caused by the West’s ignorance of the changing socio-political expectations within its societies by interpreting these tendencies as temporary or exceptional. In other words, ideological bias prevented Western liberals from a correct and in-depth reading of the socio-political transformation taking place both in the world and at home. As a result, anti-establishment actors have succeeded in defeating liberal institutions and rules, as well as directly liberal values and policies at the ballot box in many Western countries called “institutional democracies.” Even those who failed to win have ensured that their "populist" discourses, proposals and political agendas have been accepted by centrist politics.
Another point partly implied in the report, and on which European and American liberals agree, is that liberal democracy is no longer the only hegemonic regime or ideology. In this respect, liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes are now positioned in direct opposition. However, in contrast to the strategic competition in the great power struggle, the ideological competition is between liberal and "illiberal" democracies. This is because the first rule of liberal hegemony is that a democracy can only be a true democracy if it is liberal and that alternative systems are not regarded as democratically possible or proper.
At this point, other alternatives, defined by various concepts such as illiberal democracy, hybrid regime, authoritarian democracy and competitive authoritarianism, are defined as "backsliding regimes." In fact, whenever anyone directly opposing liberalism or the established political order comes to power in any state, the label "authoritarian" is immediately attached. These actors are already defined by negative terms such as radical, populist and authoritarian.
On the other hand, the most important advantage that liberal democracy has for the protection of its "shaky" ideological hegemony is this supreme power of "identification" and "interpretation." Its most powerful weapon is its ability to define its rivals in negative contexts and to dominate these concepts or definitions in various fields and contexts by means of the hegemonic instruments it has at its disposal. In this way, based on multiple liberal values, in particular freedom, it can both claim a so-called moral superiority over dissident actors and provide international support for its partners representing liberal ideology in "backsliding" countries. Moreover, thanks to its hegemony in the political institutions, bureaucracy, cultural community and, until recently, even the field of technology, this advantage has acquired a monopolistic quality that goes beyond superiority.
At this juncture, the strategy of liberal democracy to protect its hegemony by establishing so-called moral supremacy and thereby generating consent has not had much success lately. Anti-establishment actors in the "strongholds" of liberal democracy continue to use their own concepts, values, ideas and views through a structure that listens directly to popular segments dissatisfied with the establishment and its banal discourse. They are not trapped in the indirect representational mechanisms of liberal democracy.
It involves resistance to the values that liberal democracy imposes on individuals, societies and even the international community, such as freedom and progressivism, and the embrace of local, national or spiritual values. This strategy, which can be called a "politics of self-worth," promotes its own values and, therefore, its own story. As an anti-hegemon, it defines its truths and values. It defends the rightness and even the superiority of its moral system, placing this at the center of this strategy.
And this leads to a new struggle: hegemonic competition. This competition, which is also called socio-political polarization, is essentially between liberals and anti-establishment actors. Although they are hegemonic in their world, they cannot generate consent from the other side. Ideological competition thus takes on a hegemonic dimension. More specifically, there is a hegemonic competition between liberal politics, characterized as international, and the politics of self-valorization, which is usually local and national.
The differences in the values and ideological perspectives of these two poles naturally impact how national and international issues are viewed. Getting this hegemonic competition right is crucial to understanding local and global politics today and in the near future. In doing so, the key concept could be the politics of self-valorization.
