Myanmar's ongoing civil war is unlikely to end as long as the junta remains confrontational. The military regime shows no sign that it is willing to loosen its hold on power despite an attitude fueling more armed resistance. Much of Myanmar is mired in social, political, ethnic and economic disorder. Since the February 2021 military coup, which ousted the de facto civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi's elected administration, the Southeast Asian country of 56 million has seen thousands of killings in clashes, and 3 million people have been displaced internally.
The country has a gloomy past of ethnic insurgencies and military rule. In the current conflict, several powerful anti-regime militias are involved with disharmonious goals. After independence from Britain in 1948, the country known formerly as Burma enjoyed parliamentary democracy until the 1962 military coup. General Ne Win, who ruled for the next 26 years, made sure the country remained poor and isolated from the rest of the world. Ne Win founded the Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP), which monopolized power through repression. After anti-government protests and unrest began in 1987, the powerful general resigned in 1988 and his BSPP was replaced with the State Law and Order Restoration Council. It was a cosmetic change reflective of the contempt the military, also known as the Tatmadaw, held for those demanding civilian rule.
Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) was founded the same year, heralding a long democracy-versus-dictatorship saga, especially for the Western public. Suu Kyi, the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991, was projected as a symbol of democracy and human rights. She enjoyed that good image until 2017, when the Myanmar military launched a campaign of ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Rohingya people in Rakhine state, also known as Arakan, in western Myanmar.
In 2019, she defended the military's brutal actions at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in a genocide case brought by Gambia with the backing of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Having served as the de facto leader of the civilian administration when the Rohingya suffered what the United Nations described as "a textbook example of ethnic cleansing," she can be potentially prosecuted for crimes against humanity and genocide. Despite her tarnished reputation, Suu Kyi enjoys considerable support. However, the eruption of multiple zones of conflict and the growing power of armed militias have diminished her role in resolving the intractable conflict. She can no longer be considered the figure who can rally various ethnic groups around her in the country, in which about 60% of people are ethnic Bamar.
According to a May 2024 report by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M), a group of international experts, the junta lost control over townships covering 86% of the country's territory with 67% of the population.
A reasonably peaceful solution was possible when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) came up with the "Five-Point Consensus" in April 2021. The 10-member group was frustrated by the lack of cooperation from the junta chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. The ASEAN initiative called for an immediate end to violence, talks among all parties, the appointment of a special envoy, humanitarian access and the special envoy's visit to Myanmar to engage with different parties.
Myanmar is not just an oddity within ASEAN but a setback to the group's vision that promotes regional prosperity, trade, connectivity and people-to-people exchanges. It is out of line to talk about economic growth and prosperity when Myanmar is riven by fighting. Armed groups have gained control of most of the country's border area with Bangladesh, China, India and Thailand.
A powerful rebel coalition known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BA), separate from the pro-Suu Kyi shadow National Unity Government (NUG), has made significant territorial gains in its ongoing "Operation 1027" offensive launched in October 2023. It comprises the Buddhist-based Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) of the Mandarin-speaking Kokang ethnic group and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front representing the Ta'ang ethnic group.
China has a complicated relationship with Myanmar as it has been a key backer of the military regime but reportedly helped the Three Brotherhood Alliance in key battles near its border. China also reportedly brokered a cease-fire between the rebel alliance and junta forces.
The NUG is trying to overthrow the coup regime of the State Administration Council (SAC) through its armed wing, the People's Defense Forces (PDF), while Suu Kyi and deposed President U Win Myint remain jailed on various charges.
Despite facing the combined rebel onslaught in different regions, especially in the north and northeast as well as along the Bay of Bengal, the junta's forces have maintained control of central Myanmar and the capital Naypyidaw. However, the military suffers from weak morale and would find it hard to regain control of the vast swathes of territory it has lost. Slimmer still are the chances of the junta enjoying political legitimacy again, either at home or internationally.
The junta understands the situation may become more volatile. It appears it has borrowed tactical maneuver methods from its armed opponents. It can be gauged from the China-brokered cease-fire with the Brotherhood Alliance as well as from the military's tactical reluctance not to fight the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) while the Rohingya force takes on the Arakan Army.
The Rohingya people have suffered attacks and atrocities by the Arakan Army for years. This creates a situation in which the junta would not mind the RSO making gains against the Arakan Army. Since the Rohingya issue is a global one, the Arakan Army is mistaken in thinking it can create and hold on to a proto-state on Rohingya lands.
The Rohingya issue will continue to remain central to Myanmar's future stability and long-term peace. More than 1 million members of this persecuted Muslim minority are living in Bangladesh, mostly in miserable conditions in the Cox Bazar region. Other countries, including Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Thailand, also host hundreds of thousands of displaced Rohingya people. These displaced people must go back to where they belong – the Arakan region, where they have lived for generations. Since they face hostility in their return and are likely to be subjected to human rights violations and genocidal atrocities, international protection will be required for their resettlement. The role of Bangladesh's new government in supporting international efforts to resolve the Rohingya problem will be crucial. An internationally supervised Rohingya return would ensure broader stability in Myanmar.
The United Nations said in August its special envoy for Myanmar, Julie Bishop, "is engaging all stakeholders, including regional actors, to move towards an inclusive Myanmar-led process for sustainable peace and national reconciliation that are important steps to create the conditions conducive to the safe, the voluntary, the dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya people to their homes in Myanmar." However, the U.N. efforts are inadequate and do not take into account the radically changed ground situation. Influential international players should have intervened when the Rohingya region was being emptied of the population, but it is never too late. They can reach out to anti-junta groups representing scores of ethnic groups to speed up a search for viable solutions to end the civil war. Many minority ethnic groups seek viable autonomy within Myanmar. Accommodating their demands would create conditions for peace.
ASEAN can play a vital role in promoting political understanding and economic rejuvenation of the country, but its Five-Point Consensus looks outdated due to the changed nature of the conflict. The junta must understand that Myanmar's future is no longer in the isolationism imposed by Ne Win and followed by the later military bosses.
