The ongoing civil war in Syria has paralyzed the country’s energy sector, rendering it heavily dependent on imports from Iran. Since late 2011, when international sanctions came into effect, Syria has ceased oil exports and has relied almost entirely on Iranian fuel imports to sustain electricity supplies. This protracted conflict has placed Syria in a historically challenging period, with the country facing severe obstacles in meeting its electricity demand.
These challenges stem from the war’s impacts, the fragmented control over fossil fuel resources among various factions, insufficient production capacities, the closure of oil companies, the destruction of the electricity grid, inadequate conversion capacities, the financial fragility of energy institutions and the cessation of imports. Furthermore, electricity demand is expected to rise even further due to population growth and industrialization. Rebuilding the national economy and pursuing socio-economic development, therefore, requires a secure, sustainable and efficient energy sector.
Due to its unique geostrategic position as a gateway from Asia to the Mediterranean, Syria plays a vital role in the energy policies of global and regional powers in the Middle East. During the Arab Spring of 2011, while countries like Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt experienced rapid transitions, strategic energy hubs such as Libya, Yemen and Syria descended into civil wars, transforming into failed states. Libya holds significance for Europe’s energy security, Yemen for controlling the strategic Bab al-Mandeb maritime trade route and Syria for its potential as a shorter and more efficient transit route for transporting oil and natural gas from South Pars, Basra, Qatar and the Kirkuk-Mosul fields to the Mediterranean through energy pipelines.
The years of intense conflict have inflicted irreparable damage on Syria’s political and economic landscape, with the economic consequences of the crisis continuing to weigh heavily on the Syrian population. The degradation of public services, particularly the worsening electricity crisis, has profoundly shaped this trajectory. Electricity is not only essential for the functioning of the national economy but also critical for the daily lives of Syrian citizens. Since the onset of the war in 2011, the destruction of numerous power plants and infrastructure, combined with the inability to secure the fuel necessary to operate these facilities, has significantly reduced the domestic electricity supply. Over 50% of Syria’s electricity grid has been rendered inoperative due to the destruction of infrastructure and transmission lines.
Syria’s electricity production over the past two decades has been overwhelmingly reliant on traditional fossil fuels, which account for more than 80% of total electricity generation. In 2017, Syria produced approximately 17,474 TWh of electricity, of which 10.56 TWh was generated from natural gas, and 6.9 TWh was produced using fuel oil and diesel. Thermal power plants accounted for 96% of this production, while hydroelectric plants contributed 4%. This represents a stark 58% decline compared to production levels in 2011. The situation is further exacerbated by the acute shortage of gas and fuel required to operate power plants.
Assessing Syria’s renewable energy potential becomes crucial at this juncture. Situated in the solar belt, Syria receives high levels of solar radiation and enjoys approximately 300 sunny days per year. Additionally, there are numerous areas where the average annual wind speed exceeds 6 meters per second. Regions such as Sendiania, Barshin and others are well-suited for wind energy investments. In this context, evaluating the current state of Syria’s electricity sector and exploring how alternative energy sources – particularly wind and solar energy – can be integrated into the national electricity grid is imperative. Reports indicate that Syria requires 23 million cubic meters of gas daily but can supply only 6.5 million. Similarly, while 10,000 tons of fuel are needed daily, only 4,500 tons can be secured. This acute fuel shortage has drastically reduced electricity availability, limiting supply to 2-4 hours daily.
The energy geopolitics surrounding Syria, influenced by global and regional powers, present several potential scenarios. The first consists of Syria's rebuilding a partnership with Russia and Iran. This scenario involves transporting oil from South Pars, Mosul and Kirkuk fields through northern Syria to Mediterranean ports or via southern Iraq and the Tanf border crossing to Tartus Port. On the other hand, Syria may also turn its face to a U.S.-Gulf cooperation. That scenario focuses on connecting Gulf oil and gas – particularly from Qatar – to Jordan and Israel.
Yet there is also a third option, which involves the Qatar-Türkiye gas pipeline. If revived, this pipeline could also integrate northern Iraqi oil, positioning Türkiye as a central hub for Europe’s energy market. A land-based route through Syria to Türkiye’s existing infrastructure would provide a shorter, technically simpler and more cost-effective alternative. This could also present an opportunity for Lebanon, which has recently initiated offshore exploration but lacks its own export infrastructure. Notably, Lebanon, not being a member of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), might find the Turkish route particularly attractive if its gas exploration efforts succeed.
The potential collapse of the 54-year Assad regime introduces the possibility of a new regional order. While much remains uncertain, Türkiye, as the host of the majority of Syrian refugees and a key advocate for Syria’s political stability, is positioned as a pivotal actor in shaping the region’s energy security future.
Türkiye is projected to expand its strategic depth in the Eastern Mediterranean significantly. The EastMed Pipeline project, a proposed 1,900-kilometer (1,180-mile) deep-sea pipeline connecting Israel and Cyprus to Greece, has encountered significant technical and financial challenges. The U.S. withdrawal of support for the project in 2022 delivered a substantial blow to its feasibility.
If political developments in Syria prove favorable, Türkiye could pursue its goal of becoming a gas hub while positioning itself as a leader in the region’s clean energy transition. Integrating the Türkiye-Syria electricity grid could become a crucial node in the emerging Eastern Mediterranean electricity network. Such infrastructure would help manage the intermittency of renewable energy sources and position Türkiye as a growing regional power system.
These developments could foster economic cooperation and, through increased interdependence, help alleviate geopolitical tensions. While the emerging regional power architecture offers promise, Syria faces significant structural and market challenges. Establishing a stable, internationally recognized government remains uncertain, but lifting Western sanctions on Syrian oil imports could represent a significant step forward. Such a move would be attractive for Damascus, as oil exports accounted for 25% of Syria’s financial revenues in 2010.
There is an urgent need to relax sanctions on the energy sector. Given Western energy security concerns, exemptions could be granted to meet supply needs. However, rebuilding energy production will require substantial time, financial resources and advanced technology due to the destruction caused by the war. These changes cannot occur overnight, but the policies adopted by the U.S. and the EU will play a decisive role in shaping Syria’s energy security.
