John Mearsheimer emphasizes that states focus on survival in an anarchic international system when constructing their security. According to him, every actor competes to maximize their power. Russia's behavior in the Ukraine war confirms this approach in the different interpretations of actors' mutual perceptions of security. In this framework, Russia's aggressive policies in Georgia and Ukraine can be interpreted as a defense mechanism against NATO's eastward expansion. Mearsheimer argues that, especially in the Ukraine crisis, the West's policy of NATO expansion provoked Russia and that these conflicts were inevitable. However, the nature of wars and violence is beyond the justification debate, as wars have no real winners.
In this context, the change in U.S. policy toward Russia, which is caused by President Donald Trump's coming to power, is visible. In a 180-degree transformation, a new course in U.S.-Russia relations has begun, departing from the era of the former U.S. President Joe Biden. Of course, Trump's personality and approaches to inter-leader relations have also been decisive in this process. In this context, the main question to be asked is: Is the U.S. contributing to the realization of Russia's "Greater Russia" discourse, or is it acting on a political line that considers Russia's red lines, as Mearsheimer states, to end the war?
During his election campaign, Trump promised to end the war between Russia and Ukraine within 24 hours. However, 100 days have passed since Trump assumed the presidency and the picture on the ground has evolved into a situation where Russia is advancing. The negotiating table is facing the risk of Ukraine's territorial loss.
The most important issue is that Trump and his administration have taken a lower-profile approach to the cease-fire. The second important point is that instead of prioritizing the cease-fire, the focus has shifted to normalization between Russia and the U.S.
However, how is this normalization reflected at the table and on the ground? When we seek an answer to this question, the reality is that Ukraine, despite being a party to the war, is not being sufficiently listened to and is not even seen as an active participant in the cease-fire process.
As it is known, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Trump met in the Oval Office, the process did not proceed by diplomatic conventions, and a picture emerged in which Zelenskyy was almost scolded. This meeting was recorded as an example of a violation of international diplomatic conventions that relations between leaders should be conducted on an equal footing, creating the impression that Ukraine was positioned as an exposed actor despite being a party to the war.
Following this meeting, the U.S. suspended military aid to Ukraine for a while, leading to a favorable course for Russia. Although relations between the U.S. and Ukraine entered this fragile phase, the European Union's support for Ukraine continued. Various meetings in Ukraine were organized under the leadership of the U.K. and France. While these meetings ostensibly aimed to resolve the conflict, their primary outcome was the formation of a new European security architecture, rather than addressing Ukraine’s immediate concerns. Despite being an active party to the war, Ukraine gradually became a forgotten actor in the broader diplomatic landscape. The announcement of partial cease-fires, particularly concerning attacks on energy infrastructures, once again revealed the complexity and fragility of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Although limited cease-fires were declared, they were ultimately not fully respected by either side.
Meanwhile, Trump’s special envoy to Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, continued his diplomatic efforts to advance the negotiation process. At this point, it became increasingly clear that the U.S. had adopted a firm stance regarding the concessions expected from Ukraine. The proposed framework urged Ukraine to forgo its aspirations for NATO membership or indefinitely postpone them. Additionally, it implied the recognition of Crimea as part of Russia. It suggested granting a special status to other territories under Russian occupation, effectively integrating them into the Russian sphere of influence. In short, it can be said that the U.S. has de facto accepted Russia's occupation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.
Such an approach contradicts the principles established after World War II under the Yalta system and the foundational tenets of the United Nations Charter, particularly those concerning the inviolability of territorial integrity and the sovereign equality of states. In this regard, the suggested concessions undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty and pose a broader challenge to the international legal order.
Indeed, one must ask whether the U.S. position vis-a-vis Russia was in violation of, or was directed toward, the principle of the sovereign equality of all members enshrined in Article 2 of the U.N. Charter and the principle of refraining from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.
Perhaps the Trump administration was, in its own words, acting to "restore peace" and "save people's lives." However, the legal dimension of the process and the conditions for a lasting peace must be carefully evaluated.
Indeed, Trump's recent statements provide some clues in this regard. Although Trump stated that he was making efforts to ensure peace, the weakness of diplomacy in the process was seen. Subsequently, Russia's advance in the field accelerated. In fact, Russia has announced that it has recaptured the Kursk region. So, the war is no longer within Russian territory.
On the other hand, it is not yet clear whether Russian President Vladimir Putin's move to declare an Easter cease-fire was a concrete step showing that they want peace or a political maneuver in line with the expectations of the Trump administration. But at the end of the day, the end of the war depends on the parties coming together in a fair, equal and equitable harmony.
Finally, the meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy at Pope Francis's funeral drew the attention of the international community. Given the pope's peaceful approach, it was a remarkable symbolic step for this meeting to take place during the funeral ceremony to ensure peace after his death.
At this point, however, it should be seriously considered whether the end of the war is not limited to the last three years but rather whether a Russia that acts with NATO's red lines and moves forward with a defensive reflex is acting with security perceptions dating back to the Cold War or whether Europe's desire to increase its own security by isolating Russia has dragged the war into an early new Cold War spiral.
Current strategies, especially Trump's appeasement of Putin over Ukraine, reveal the dangers of yielding to expansionist powers. This situation mirrors the appeasement by Britain and France toward Nazi Germany in the 1930s, which led to the disastrous Munich Agreement. Today's reluctance to confront authoritarian regimes risks encouraging further aggression. The lesson is clear: while appeasement may offer temporary relief, it often results in far more severe long-term consequences.
