The war that resumed between Israel and Hezbollah on March 2 generated a certain degree of social solidarity in Lebanon against Israeli attacks. However, outside the Shiite community, criticism of Hezbollah became more pronounced as the perception grew that the organization had initiated the conflict.
This situation became more apparent during the direct negotiations that began between Tel Aviv and Beirut in April. This process contributed especially to the emergence of a distinct position among Lebanese Christians regarding anti-Israel sentiment compared to other sects in the country. In particular, considering the historical ties between segments of the Lebanese Christian political elite and Israel, questions were raised as to whether Lebanese Christians might adopt a more pro-Israeli stance again.
The current conjuncture between Israel and Lebanon has shaped Christian attitudes not around normalization with Israel, but rather around the belief that Hezbollah dragged Lebanon into war and that Israeli attacks could be halted through Hezbollah’s elimination.
At the same time, among South Lebanese Christian communities directly affected by Israeli attacks, security concerns have deepened due to political dysfunctionality, while reactions against the occupation have intensified in response to Israel’s disproportionate violence. This situation has led Lebanese Christians to resist the occupation by refusing to abandon their homes and by appealing to the broader Christian world for support.
As a result of all these developments, differing orientations among Christian political parties, together with the social repercussions of the war and the persistence of sectarian divisions, have become increasingly visible.
Although there is a broad consensus among the Lebanese Christian political elite regarding opposition to the Israeli occupation, evaluations concerning negotiations with Israel and the future of relations with Hezbollah reflect divergent political orientations. In this context, the latest war has generated a new rupture not only regarding Hezbollah’s military capacity, but also concerning the consistency of the Christian political elite on issues of “national sovereignty” and “anti-Israel resistance.”
For example, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea strengthened his political position, particularly after the 2022 general elections and with Hezbollah’s relative military weakening. He began pursuing political maneuvers aimed at weakening Hezbollah’s Christian allies, such as the Marada Movement and the Free Patriotic Movement. However, the fact that Geagea did not display the same degree of firmness toward Israel’s occupation policies as he did toward Hezbollah created a perception of ambiguity within Lebanese Christian society.
The targeting of areas inhabited by Geagea’s Christian supporters by Israeli attacks, the death of a Lebanese Forces member in an Israeli strike, and Israel’s siege of predominantly Maronite Christian villages in southern Lebanon, alongside the killing of clergy members, intensified criticism of Geagea’s vague stance toward Israel and what some perceived as a tacit green light for normalization. This situation has produced a significant legitimacy question for the Lebanese Forces under Geagea’s leadership. While his position has broadened the social appeal of anti-Hezbollah politics, his relatively weak posture toward Israel has also generated a dual antipathy within Christian public opinion.
In contrast, the more consistent position adopted by Gebran Bassil points to a potentially new political trajectory. Although Bassil’s deteriorating relations with Hezbollah since 2022 became even more visible during the latest war, his insistence that Israel bears primary responsibility for the conflict demonstrates a more pragmatic approach and suggests that he seeks to strengthen his public image by responding more carefully to social sentiment.
Meanwhile, Suleiman Frangieh, a direct ally of Hezbollah who seeks to consolidate his political position through Hezbollah’s land-based resistance against Israel, has linked “Lebanon’s sovereignty and Arab identity” to the success of the “Resistance.” While this discourse carries significance in terms of protecting the security environment of his support base, it has not found broad resonance among the wider Christian community.
As part of its operations in southern Lebanon, Israel simultaneously implemented evacuation orders within the framework of a planned “uninhabited zone,” which also included Christian villages. In this context, Israel seeks the evacuation of approximately 10,000 Christians living in border towns such as Alma al-Shaab, Ain Ebel, Debel and Rmeish, while also signaling that the return of these Christian communities may ultimately be prevented.
For Christians who had previously been displaced during earlier wars yet managed to return each time, this situation has represented an unprecedented challenge and has triggered significant social reactions.
Accordingly, Christians living along the border have refused to abandon their villages in the face of the danger of a permanent occupation, while simultaneously seeking support from regional and international actors. In particular, the gradual withdrawal of the Lebanese army from areas where Israel has advanced has left Christian communities increasingly vulnerable. This has undermined Christian confidence both in the Lebanese government and in Christian political representatives.
At the same time, the failure of European actors to provide the support expected by Lebanese Christians has deepened communal anxieties. Although Pope Leo XIV expressed support for priests in southern Lebanon and praised their determination, the lack of any tangible political outcome was itself unexpected for many Christians.
This picture demonstrates that the Christian community in Lebanon faces not only a security threat but also a deepening sense of isolation. In particular, the weakening of state authority in border regions and the largely symbolic nature of international support have reinforced among Lebanese Christians a growing perception of “abandonment.”
Another indication of fragmentation among Lebanese Christians can be observed through regional differences. Christians living in northern Lebanon have not been directly targeted by Israeli attacks and have also avoided the severe economic devastation experienced in the south.
This has caused not only a weakening of a shared Lebanese national identity, but also a lack of solidarity among Christians, which is less cohesive than is often assumed. Indeed, the relatively stable living standards of northern Christian communities and their limited exposure to the war have reduced their sensitivity to developments in the south.
In conclusion, although the Christian community in Lebanon is not a direct party to the current phase of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, it has become one of the most vulnerable actors affected by the security, demographic and political fractures produced by the war.
The transformation of Christian settlements in southern Lebanon into conflict zones, together with the weakness of state authority, has generated profound uncertainty regarding the future of the community. At the same time, while many Christians who oppose another civil war believe that Hezbollah’s regional military strategy is dragging Lebanon toward renewed destruction, concerns are also steadily increasing over the possibility that Israel’s military advance could result in a permanent occupation and long-term demographic transformation.
