Since Israel assassinated several Iranian high-profile officials, including Col. Hassan Sayyad Khodaei, one of the top commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, on May 22, Iran and Israel’s hostile rhetoric has intensified. Even though public enmity toward Israel is a matter of pride for Iran, the fact that it would be impossible to reciprocate is something Iran struggles with as Tehran is unable to attack Israelis on Israeli land. To compensate for this, Tehran attempts to carry this war to third parties, most recently, Turkey.
Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid's announcement that Israelis should leave Turkey came right after this incident. The minister announced that Tehran was planning to kidnap and assassinate Israeli tourists in Turkey – intelligence that was reportedly shared by Turkish authorities. Using Turkey as the target was a strategic choice as Iran wants to disturb the rapprochement process between Turkey and Israel, which historically shared strategic ties that suffered in the last decade, particularly after the Mavi Marmara raid that caused the death of 10 activists.
Tehran also wants to legitimize its international intervention by linking national security to trans-border operations, a policy that gains more importance during the current economic recession in Iran. If successful, Tehran will have significant room to maneuver in the international arena as it will prove capable of still being able to punish an actor like Israel whose military capabilities have gained fame in recent years, or at least reciprocate the Israeli assassinations.
Finally, Iran wants to disturb Ankara, which is on the opposite side when it comes to many international affairs such as Syria, Iraq and Azerbaijan. Moreover, domestically Iran claims that a dam built by Turkey has caused climate change and prompted a dust storm in the country.
Iran's tension with Turkey and Israel has to do with changing regional dynamics. A network of relations has not existed since the Mavi Marmara incident. The timing of this process is also interesting. Turkey did not stand against Iran, especially in the regional order established during Donald Trump’s presidency in the U.S. As a matter of fact, between 2016 and 2020, Turkey was on the target board of the global alliance (built and encouraged by Trump) together with Iran and Qatar. Therefore, Turkey and Iran had similar concerns regarding regional polarization. However, relations between Iran and Turkey have been strained in the new equation formed in the region. Especially in Syria, it can be predicted that Turkey and Iran will face more confrontation.
Due to Russia's prioritization of the Ukraine war, reducing its military presence in Syria creates a power vacuum in the region. Iran is quite willing to deploy its militias in these areas. Turkey, on the other hand, remains determined to oppose the terrorist state project in northern Syria, and these two different projections increase the tension between Iran and Turkey. It is possible that Turkey and Israel will cooperate in Syria in the fight against Iran. As a matter of fact, when we look at the normalization results in Turkish foreign policy recently, the rapprochement between Israel and its close allies like Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) shows that the cooperation between Israel and Turkey in the Syrian field may increase. Therefore, in terms of Iran, Turkey, which has changed the regional balance of power in Libya and Syria with military projections, is going from being an actor that does not conflict to a rival. In other words, the Iran-Turkey rivalry is heating up in the emerging regional dynamics. The Israeli-Turkish rapprochement may cause Iran to become more marginalized and increase its aggressive policies by instrumentalizing militias and proxies. As a matter of fact, Turkey’s rapprochement with Israel and the Gulf, with the encouragement of the U.S. under the presidency of Joe Biden, is disturbing Iran. This situation may increase Iran's anti-Turkey activities in both Syria and Iraq. In this sense, the audio recordings leaked to the press in the past months were interpreted as a sign that Iran's anti-Turkey activities would increase. The statements by the head of the intelligence unit of the Revolutionary Guards that "operations will be carried out with the PKK against the Turkish military presence in Iraq" can be understood as meaning that the tension between Iran and Turkey will intensify in Iraq and Syria.
In the Israel-Iran conflict, Turkey has emerged as a crucial ally to Tel Aviv since Turkish intelligence fought tooth and nail to preserve the normalization process between the two countries. In this regard, many predict that Turkey and Israel may cooperate in Syria, and thus military operations against Bashar Assad’s militia may be possible. It was already known that, with the permission of Russia, Israel from time to time entered Syrian airspace and struck Iranian militias. With the withdrawal of Russia from Syria and Wagner Group mercenaries from Libya, Israel gave an ultimatum to Assad: “If Iran's influence is not reduced, the threat that we will hit Assad in Damascus shows that Israel will be more effective in the Syrian field.”
Iran's geopolitical loss in the region in recent years continues. Since 1992, Iran has been presenting the deadlock in the Karabakh issue as a solution. Despite being Shiite, Tehran did not support Azerbaijan and sided with the status quo. With Turkey’s intervention and the active use of drones (Bayraktar), the changing status quo turned in favor of Turkey, against Iran. In these changing balances, Iran has suffered a significant geopolitical loss in its relations with Asia, the Middle East and Turkey. Moreover, the Azerbaijan-Armenia issue, in which Turkey is involved, brought along demographic challenges for Iran. In this sense, many scenarios began to be discussed. Iranian Azerbaijani are seen as a security threat to the Tehran regime. Therefore, it is possible to talk about a negative portrait of Iran, internationally, regionally and locally.
The surprising point is that Iran chose Turkey instead of countries with a large Iranian population like the UAE. Arguably the most important reason for Tehran to clash with Ankara is Turkey’s upcoming operation in northern Syria's Tal Rifaat and Manbij. As a matter of fact, the country most disturbed by this operation is Iran. At this point, Iran is even more uncomfortable than Russia. While Turkey maintains diplomatic talks with Russia before the operation, it has not discussed the Syria file with Iran for a while. Iran is also reacting seriously to this issue, as it puts Syria first for its security.
*Researcher at Sakarya University Middle East Institute
