Following the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the structure of the international system transformed from bipolarity into a unipolarity led by the United States, often characterized as the “unipolar moment” as claimed by Charles Krauthammer. However, following the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2008 global economic crisis, the Arab Spring and recent developments such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, the leadership of the U.S. has been challenged by some other emerging actors starting from the early 2000s.
As the Munich Security Report 2025 highlights, we are witnessing a "multipolarization," in which more influential actors in the international system are emerging, in parallel with a significant polarization between and within the states. It seems like in this new multipolar international system, while the U.S. and China are the strongest powers, there are other influential powers such as Russia, India, the EU, as well as regional powers such as Türkiye, Brazil, Nigeria, Malaysia, South Africa and Iran. These countries have gradually increased their economic, military and diplomatic capabilities, creating alternative centers of influence beyond the Western-led order.
In such a process of multipolarization at the systemic level, as a middle or regional power that punches above its weight, Türkiye has a unique position that warrants closer scrutiny. Thus, Turkish foreign policy, even though it enjoys some advantages of multipolarity, displays a complex and uncertain pattern.
Traditionally, Turkish foreign policy has demonstrated three main responses to such major transformations. Firstly, Türkiye would try to defend the status quo, particularly its borders and national integrity. Secondly, Türkiye would seek to act in concert with the Western powers, namely European countries and the U.S., during such transformative periods. Lastly, Türkiye would balance the revisionist actors with other influential actors in the international system. For instance, after receiving the Soviet demands in 1945, which included new arrangements along the Turkish-Soviet border, Türkiye strongly rejected those demands and sought political and military support from the Western countries to balance the Soviet threat.
The multipolarization of the international system challenges the two main principles of Turkish foreign policy. Firstly, the international system will most probably bring with it demands for revisionism. For instance, while U.S. President Donald Trump's administration explicitly recognized Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem, it tacitly approves its occupation of Gaza and parts of Syria and Lebanon. At the same time, it also tacitly approves the Russian annexation of parts of Ukraine, namely Crimea and the eastern parts, simply by stating that “restoring Ukraine’s borders to their pre-2014 lines is unrealistic.” This context provides a framework for understanding Türkiye’s support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine. More importantly, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statement “Hamas is the forward line defense of Anatolia in Gaza” proves that the Turkish government is well aware of the challenges to the status quo that come with the newly developing multipolarity in the international system.
The second broad challenge to Turkish foreign policy will be its traditionally Western-oriented direction. In fact, this orientation has clearly diminished, particularly over the last decade, following several crises between Türkiye and Western countries. It seems that the new structure of the international system, based on the increased number of influential actors, has already ruptured the “Western bloc.” Today, it is no secret that the U.S. and the EU see Russia and China differently. While the Trump administration is pursuing a “reverse Nixon” strategy toward China, the EU, on the other hand, is actively debating the military measures to be taken against the Russian threat without American involvement. In this context, even if Türkiye were to pursue a Western-oriented foreign policy, it is highly likely that the Western bloc would not maintain the unified foreign policy stance it once had.
The least visible effect of the aforementioned multipolarity may be observed in Türkiye’s traditional balancing policy, which dates back to the 18th century of the Ottoman Empire. Türkiye has historically pursued a balancing strategy between East and West, as well as within the Western bloc itself. However, today, Türkiye must simultaneously balance Western and Eastern global powers, alongside autonomous regional actors such as Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia.
As a result, the transformation of the international system into a multipolar world has become inevitable, particularly under Trump 2.0. The return of Trump to the White House would likely accelerate many of the already visible fractures within this evolving order. His renewed skepticism toward NATO and insistence that European allies shoulder more of the defense burden could reshape the alliance’s structure and leave Türkiye navigating new regional security uncertainties. Likewise, Trump’s reluctance to provide continued military aid to Ukraine indirectly empowers Russia, forcing Türkiye to reassess its policies in the Black Sea region. On the trade front, Trump’s promise to reinstate tariffs and revive a protectionist “America First” agenda would have ripple effects for Türkiye, which is seeking a larger role in global value chains.
In such a multipolar context, Türkiye should, on the one hand, deepen its traditional balancing policy, and on the other hand, prepare itself for the new challenges to the current status quo. To this end, investments in the defense industry should continue without losing momentum and investments in advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence and semiconductors need to be increased.
