In energy diplomacy, the relationships between three state actors play a crucial role in navigating challenges and fostering successful cooperation. The presence of common interests in overcoming difficulties and achieving joint successes is essential for formulating a strategy within a strong trilateral cooperation framework. Iran is Türkiye’s second-largest natural gas supplier after Russia, and now Turkmenistan has entered the picture. Turkmenistan has the potential to become one of the world’s largest natural gas producers. Its gas is currently exported to neighboring countries such as China, Russia and Iran. With the addition of Türkiye, diversifying energy exports would contribute to Europe’s energy supply security.
Energy cooperation between Türkiye and Turkmenistan could significantly impact both the Middle East and Central Asia. Diplomatic engagements between Ankara and Ashgabat have been ongoing for a long time. One key point to remember is that Turkmenistan reached an agreement to transport natural gas to Türkiye via Azerbaijan and Georgia. This agreement was announced by Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar.
According to Chronicles of Turkmenistan, Bayraktar met with Azerbaijani Economy Minister Mikayil Jabbarov in Istanbul. Following the meeting, the parties signed an agreement to increase the capacity of several natural gas pipelines. The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of Türkiye stated that this agreement would enable the transportation of additional volumes of natural gas from Azerbaijan and the Caspian region to Türkiye and Europe by 2030, though exact figures have not yet been disclosed. However, Bayraktar did not specify how the gas would be delivered from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan.
Currently, due to the lack of progress in constructing a trans-Caspian gas pipeline that would allow for direct shipments, Iran’s absence from the agreement suggests the possibility of a supply swap arrangement through Iran. Turkmenistan has reached an agreement with Türkiye’s state energy company, BOTAŞ, for the transit of its natural gas to Türkiye via Iran using the SWAP method.
This significant development was reported during a phone call between the chairperson of Turkmenistan’s Government Council, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. During the conversation, Berdimuhamedov stated: “Our countries have been cooperating in the energy sector for many years. Within this framework, Turkmenistan’s natural gas will be delivered to Türkiye via Iran through a SWAP agreement with BOTAŞ.”
This announcement did not surprise industry stakeholders. Between 2022 and 2024, Turkmenistan exported gas to Azerbaijan. However, in January 2024, exports were suspended due to disagreements between Ashgabat and Baku over gas volumes and pricing. The ongoing turbulence between the two countries will alter regional dynamics. It may reduce the commercial appeal of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and the Southern Gas Corridor, decrease European dependence on Azerbaijan and bring alternative projects for transporting Turkmen gas directly to Europe to the forefront.
Azerbaijan will likely face pricing pressure on its gas exports, increasing competition. This situation could push Azerbaijan to enter long-term contracts with Europe and develop alternative strategies for its gas exports. Meanwhile, Iran stands to gain economic and geopolitical advantages from transporting Turkmen gas to Türkiye. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have had longstanding disputes over gas fields in the Caspian Sea. However, recent joint projects, such as the Dostluk field, have increased their cooperation potential. The transportation of Turkmen gas to Türkiye via Iran will inevitably affect Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan relations. If plans for gas transportation through the Caspian Sea are disrupted or an agreement is not reached, Turkmenistan – so long as it can export gas through Iran – will have less need to negotiate with Azerbaijan for exports via TANAP. While Turkmenistan’s rapprochement with Iran poses a disadvantage for Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan must take steps to enhance its energy cooperation with Turkmenistan and turn this new geopolitical shift to its advantage.
Considering the challenges at hand and the possibility of Iran reestablishing its influence in a scenario that excludes Azerbaijan, Iraq emerges as another alternative. Turkmenistan’s ambition to export gas to Türkiye and contribute to Europe’s energy supply security points to a potential “Plan C” involving Baghdad. The continued pivot toward the Middle East makes it highly likely that any viable solution will pass through Iran and Iraq. Although political issues may render this alternative a distant possibility, Ashgabat has already initiated gas swap agreements and electricity trade partnerships with Baghdad and Tehran. Given these developments and future expectations, this energy diplomacy has the potential to evolve into a long-term peace-building initiative for the Middle East and an energy security project for Europe.
A major obstacle to this scenario is financial cooperation. Both Iran and Turkmenistan have faced challenges in the past due to debt issues, which could become the biggest barrier to larger energy flows unless a stable financial partnership is established. Additionally, considering that such cooperation would require investment in the necessary infrastructure, it is crucial for all partners to ensure financial sustainability.
The Middle East has been characterized by turbulence – both in Iran’s relations with the EU and the U.S. and in Iraq’s internal stability. Other state actors, such as Syria, could also be critical for uninterrupted energy flows in the proposed project. The global perception of key stakeholders will inevitably play a role. The EU and the U.S., for political reasons, are reluctant to engage with all three countries involved – Iran, Iraq and Turkmenistan. If the route passing through the Persian Gulf is considered the most financially and politically viable solution, the existing pipeline infrastructure is both outdated and not operating at full capacity.
While this creates significant opportunities for increased natural gas trade, it also raises concerns about what would happen if these flows were to expand. It highlights the need for greater infrastructure maintenance and possibly expansion with new pipeline networks and even LNG terminals. Given all these factors, overcoming the obstacles that prevent the three countries from pursuing a common energy agenda will require a concrete action plan. In this context, neighboring countries and external actors with access to capital, diplomatic leverage and energy-hungry markets could emerge as critical allies. The Iran-Iraq-Turkmenistan energy triangle holds the potential to alleviate some of the energy security concerns that arose from the 2022 energy crisis, particularly for markets such as the EU.
Although the likelihood of this scenario materializing remains low, the most probable outcome is continued instability. However, this possibility still offers a road map to break out of the cycle of uncertainty. To realize this potential, regional political and economic instabilities must be addressed, infrastructure investments must be increased, and international cooperation must be strengthened.
Historical disputes, security risks and deficiencies in energy infrastructure make it challenging for this triangle to become a reliable supplier to major markets such as Europe. Nevertheless, at a time when energy supply security is becoming increasingly critical, collaborative projects among Iran, Iraq and Turkmenistan could not only promote regional economic development but also introduce new balancing factors in global energy markets. While this remains an unlikely scenario, it is essential for the parties involved to engage in long-term strategic planning to support this process.
