As the confrontation between Iran and Israel intensifies, Türkiye is emerging as a crucial actor seeking to mediate the conflict and prevent it from spiraling into a wider regional war.
With its strategic ties to both Tehran and Washington, and its principled foreign policy rooted in regional stability, Ankara is positioning itself as one of the few powers capable of engaging both sides constructively.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has spearheaded Türkiye’s diplomatic efforts in recent days, engaging in multiple calls with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and U.S. President Donald Trump, while urging restraint and advocating for dialogue. These efforts are expected to continue at the 51st Session of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Foreign Ministers’ Council, to be hosted in Istanbul on June 21-22. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is set to attend, offering a rare opportunity for behind-the-scenes diplomacy as regional tensions remain high.
Türkiye’s response, according to Serhan Afacan, director of the Center for Iranian Studies (IRAM), is shaped by a nuanced understanding of both structural and conjunctural elements.
“In the current conflict, I believe Israel has two primary goals – one political, the other rhetorical. The political aim is to permanently terminate Iran’s nuclear program. The rhetorical aim is to topple the Iranian regime,” Afacan told Daily Sabah. “The reason I categorize regime change as rhetorical is because I don’t believe that the Islamic Republic of Iran can be brought down through this type of military pressure.”
He added that Türkiye sees Israel’s recent operations, including the June 14 drone strike on Iran’s massive South Pars gas field, as part of a broader campaign aimed at destabilizing the region.
“Türkiye views these strikes not merely as isolated events, but as part of a strategic effort to sabotage diplomacy, particularly any potential U.S.-Iran negotiations,” Afacan said. “Israel’s longstanding expansionist policy, combined with its aggressive posture since Oct. 7, 2023, poses a serious threat not only to the two-state solution but to regional stability.”
At the same time, Ankara does not consider Iran the instigator of the current conflict. “Iran has not started the war and has the right to legitimate self-defense under international law,” Afacan noted. “But Iran must not close the door to diplomacy. Its nuclear program should be addressed within the framework of international law, taking regional dynamics into account.”
Afacan added he sees Tehran’s objectives as threefold: to re-establish deterrence through its response to Israeli attacks, to avoid direct confrontation with the United States and to ultimately return to the negotiating table without appearing weakened.
“Personally, I do not believe that the U.S. under Trump will directly strike Iran,” Afacan said. “Such a move would not align with Trump’s political goals. As long as the U.S. remains out of the fight, I don’t expect a long or large-scale war.”
Nonetheless, the conflict poses real risks for Türkiye, particularly in the areas of energy security, domestic stability and migration. Israel’s attack on Iran’s South Pars field, the world’s largest natural gas site, has heightened concerns in Ankara. Iran produces over 250 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually and is Türkiye’s key energy partner. Earlier this year, Türkiye began receiving Turkmen gas via swap through Iran, with plans to import 1.3 bcm by the end of 2025.
“While there is no immediate supply problem, especially during the low-demand summer months, the possibility of a long-term disruption is a real concern,” Afacan warned. “Türkiye has made serious investments in diversifying its energy sources, but a deeper conflict could still undermine its strategic energy planning.”
Another area of concern is Türkiye’s eastern border. Though no large-scale migration from Iran has occurred yet, Turkish officials remain alert to the possibility of a renewed refugee flow. “Türkiye has already faced irregular migration from Iran, mostly involving Afghans,” Afacan said. “If the Iranian state weakens, we could see new waves of migration. This remains a significant latent risk.”
In addition, Ankara is watching developments closely with respect to PKK-affiliated Iranian groups such as the PJAK. “These groups have so far stayed aloof from the PKK’s disarmament momentum,” Afacan noted. “A destabilized Iran could give them new space to operate, which would pose direct challenges to Türkiye’s internal security and the broader ‘terror-free Türkiye’ vision.”
Complementing this perspective, Ismail Sarı, professor at Hacı Bayram Veli University highlighted the broader regional power struggle unfolding. “Over the last two decades, three military powers have dominated the region: Türkiye, Iran, and Israel,” Sarı told Daily Sabah. “This conflict is not just about immediate retaliation. It’s about shaping the future strategic order of the Middle East.”
Sarı argued that for Israel, the core issue isn’t just Iran’s nuclear program, it’s Iran’s potential normalization. “A scenario where Iran is recognized as a legitimate actor in the Middle East, strengthens its economy and builds direct ties with the U.S., as we saw under Obama, is Israel’s strategic nightmare,” he said. “Even if Iran accepts a nuclear deal, that doesn’t neutralize the threat from Israel’s perspective.”
He further noted that Israel’s military operations are designed to degrade both Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and its state command apparatus. While the assassinations of senior IRGC officials and missile strikes on sites like Natanz demonstrate tactical success, Sarı pointed out that Iran’s key retaliatory capacity remains intact. “Iran’s missile systems and fortified facilities like Fordo have proven resilient. Israel cannot achieve full strategic dominance without U.S. involvement, especially given the depth and protection of these sites.”
Sarı warned that an expanded conflict, especially one that draws in Washington, would have grave consequences for Türkiye. “A U.S.-Iran war would bring Türkiye into a new security paradigm. Domestic discussions around ‘national survival’ could return, especially if PKK-affiliated groups gain traction in Iran and link up with entities in Iraq and Syria,” he said. “Such developments would pose a direct challenge to Türkiye’s territorial integrity and regional posture.”
"The emergence of Kurdish political movements in Iran, mirroring existing Kurdish entities in neighboring countries, could lead to a transformed security landscape for Türkiye. Should these movements receive support from PKK-affiliated structures in northern Syria and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, Türkiye may perceive this as a fundamental threat to its national integrity."
The economic outlook is equally fraught. Sarı noted that heightened conflict tends to deter investment, disrupt trade routes and diminish tourism, key components of Türkiye’s economy. “The longer this crisis lasts, the more likely Türkiye will face economic headwinds. This makes Ankara’s proactive diplomacy not just strategic but necessary,” he explained.
Despite skepticism about the success of third-party diplomacy at this stage, Sarı acknowledged Türkiye’s unique capacity to engage both Iran and Israel: “Türkiye is one of the few actors that maintains dialogue with both sides. Whether that’s enough remains to be seen, but Türkiye is right to keep pressing.”
As the June Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit approaches, all eyes will be on Istanbul. Türkiye is expected to use the platform to promote de-escalation, emphasize regional sovereignty and urge renewed diplomacy. With both the risks and responsibilities mounting, Ankara’s ability to navigate the crisis could shape not only the trajectory of the current conflict but also the balance of power in the Middle East for years to come.
