After the fall of Aleppo, a Turkish-Russian brokered cease-fire agreement has gone into effect in Syria despite several violations by the Assad regime and its allies. Nevertheless, the truce marks the first time that hopes have risen since the war began, at least for the one between the regime and the opposition groups. While Bashar Assad has begun to convey optimistic messages to the media saying an election could compel him to leave his post, leaving everything including his position on the table, it is unlikely that the Assad regime will compromise in such a situation, as history and current developments on the ground indicate. First of all, it is necessary to recall that Assad refused to leave his position when opposition forces reached the height of their goals in terms of power and unity from 2012 to 2013, gaining control of roughly more than half of the entire country.

Assad regime forces were pushed into a small territory, mainly Damascus, Latakia and Tartous as a result of agreements reached with Iran which increased support on the ground. Despite regime forces being crushed and disintegrated, Assad committed his worst war crimes with the deployment of regime air forces. His all-out efforts to save himself and the regime were insufficient; therefore compelling Russia to become involved in the war under the pretext of fighting "terrorist" groups. With the support of the Russian military and Iranian manpower, Assad was able to regain control of Aleppo, forcing opposition forces to come to the table for a truce. Meanwhile, while the Assad regime is enjoying the full support of Russia and Iran, the U.S. is busy dealing with its own domestic politics.

Turkey is left burdened with the responsibility of clearing the PKK terrorist organization's Syrian offshoot the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People's Protection Units (YPG) - along with Daesh - from its border with Syria. While it is highly unlikely that Assad will agree to leave his position, he could try to benefit from the chaotic situation. According to rumors claiming that a reconciled government will be established which will be inclusive of both the regime and the opposition, Assad is likely to involve more people from his own family and religious sect as well as certain groups loyal to his regime. It is important to mention that the sharing of power in Syria has historically been based on tribes - not political institutions.

Furthermore, due to the lack of unity among opposition groups, these groups have been reduced to rubble throughout the course of the civil war. While units within the Free Syrian Army (FSA) have largely been willing to fight alongside Turkey against Daesh and the PYD, Ahrar al-Sham has been divided into two, with one side willing to remain pro-Turkey and the other maintaining a negative stance towards Ankara.

Moreover, the radical group, Jabhat Fath Sham, formerly known as the al-Nusra Front, has been excluded from the cease-fire agreement. As Assad exerts all of his efforts on taking Aleppo back and pushing the opposition to Idlib, the possibility that he will step down or allow another person to ascend to ultimate power remains highly unlikely. If Assad had any intention to democratize Syria or to share power with disenfranchised groups, he would have done so when the war began.

Secondly, never in the history of the Assad regime has the leader of Syria been keen on enacting structural changes in Syria. Assad's predecessor and father, Hafez al-Assad, crushed opposition forces in Aleppo during the 1980s, appearing in mosques across the country and showing reverence for Islamic scholars under the ruse that he was a leader who embraced all Syrians. However, he was creating new Sunni groups loyal to himself. A few years after the Aleppo massacres, in 1986, Hafez al-Assad crushed insurgents in Hama and silenced dissident voices, discouraging from uttering a word against the regime and barring anyone who was not a member of Assad's Baath Party from taking a seat in council.

Since then, these Sunni groups have remained loyal to the Assad regime and the tribal traditions of the Assad regime have continued with some lawmakers from other political groups as well as journalists, syndicates and even Sufi lodge members and madrasas being under the control of the regime. Historically, the Assad regime has never been willing to share power. Thus, Bashar Assad, whose succession to power was as unexpected as his ability to overthrow the opposition, is unlikely to be disposed of nor will his path to power see an end unless he is discarded by Russia.