President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statements that Israel could pose a national security threat to Türkiye resonated widely both at home and abroad. Following the events of Oct. 7, 2023, Erdoğan has repeatedly described Israel’s operations in Gaza as “genocide” and accused Benjamin Netanyahu’s government of “terrorizing” Palestinians. For many years, Erdoğan has been a leader who has openly expressed his support for the Palestinian cause and his discomfort with Israel’s expansionist policies. However, his latest remarks suggest that Israel could threaten Türkiye’s national security, not only regionally but also directly.
During Erdoğan’s 22 years in power, Israel has never accepted a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. The Netanyahu government has used the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as an opportunity to pursue a more expansionist policy, especially through the crackdown on Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Western actors, particularly the U.S., turned a blind eye to Israel’s policies, while Arab countries ignored the Palestinian issue and moved toward normalization with Israel. During this period, Erdoğan sought to take advantage of the normalization process that started in 2020 and rebuild relations with Israel on a pragmatic basis.
However, in Erdoğan’s mind, Israel’s theo-political agenda has always remained a threat. In particular, the “promised land” ideology and Israel’s expansionist ambitions in the region were seen as causes for concern for Türkiye. The post-Oct. 7 attacks on Gaza and the aggressive stance of the Netanyahu government reinforced Erdoğan’s skepticism toward Israel. As Israel’s regional policies became a threat to Türkiye’s national security, Erdoğan placed Israel at the center of Türkiye’s security policy.
Erdoğan’s recent statements clearly demonstrate this placement. In his speech at the opening of the Turkish Parliament, Erdoğan said: “After Palestine and Lebanon, our homeland will be the next place that the Israeli administration, which acts with the delusion of the promised land, will set its eyes on. Israeli aggression also includes Türkiye. We will stand against this state terror with every means at our disposal for our homeland, our nation and our independence.”
This new political posture against the Netanyahu government’s expansionist policies was supported by Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli, a partner in the People’s Alliance. While criticizing Israel’s aggressive policies in Gaza and Lebanon, Bahçeli said, “By what right should we ignore the Zionist and imperialist cruelty that has taken up positions in front of our fortress walls?” Bahçeli is clearly of the same opinion as Erdoğan. The skepticism toward Israel among the Turkish political elite has become more pronounced with these statements.
In the general public and political elites, Israel has moved from being a passive “other” to becoming Türkiye’s active “other.” This approach does not mean that Türkiye can be directly targeted by Israel, nor does it suggest the scenario of a conventional war between Türkiye and Israel. However, it does mean that Israel indirectly occupies an important place in Türkiye’s national and regional security strategies in terms of threat assessment. This new situation can potentially affect the future of Türkiye-Israel relations and Ankara’s regional policies.
Erdoğan’s view of Israel as a national security threat signals a serious change in Turkish-Israeli relations. While this approach does not mean that a conventional war between the two countries is imminent, it does indicate that an era has begun in which Israel will indirectly play an important role in Türkiye’s security strategies. In particular, Israel’s aggressive policies in Gaza and Lebanon and its moves to change the regional status quo raise major security concerns for Türkiye.
Israel’s current security strategies can potentially create radical changes in the region. The effort to establish a new status quo based on occupation in Gaza and southern Lebanon reveals Israel’s aim to make its military presence in the region permanent. The long-term blockade of the Palestinian people in Gaza and the immobilization of Palestinians in the West Bank is part of Israel’s expansionist strategy in the region. It virtually eliminates the possibility of a two-state solution and undermines regional security balances.
In addition, Israel’s strategy of drawing Iran into the war could profoundly affect the regional balance. Israel is pursuing a broad strategy to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and to weaken Iranian-affiliated armed groups such as Hezbollah. If Israel launches a pre-emptive strike against Iran, it may require Türkiye to reshape its security policies. While Iran’s weakening may seem to be an advantage for Türkiye’s interests in Syria, Syria becoming a theater of Israeli-Iranian conflict could pose a major security risk for Türkiye.
Another important issue regarding Syria is Türkiye’s policy toward the PKK's Syrian wing YPG. While Türkiye views the YPG as a threat to its national security, the possibility of Israel using the YPG as a counterweight against Türkiye is also worrisome. Israel’s support for the YPG could further complicate Türkiye’s border security and fight against terrorism.
There is also the risk that the growing chaos in Lebanon could trigger a new wave of migration. While Türkiye is struggling to cope with Syrian refugees, a new wave of migration from Lebanon could further increase Türkiye’s burden. This could complicate the refugee problem that Türkiye is trying to solve through diplomatic engagement with Syria.
Another dimension of the rivalry between Israel and Türkiye is in the field of intelligence. The possibility of Israel pursuing an offensive intelligence strategy against Türkiye could complicate regional security dynamics. Especially in Syria, Iraq and the regions where Türkiye is fighting terrorism, Israel’s intelligence-disruptive activities have a high potential to pose a security risk for Türkiye.
Another aspect of Erdoğan’s policy that deepens the skepticism toward Israel is Israel’s “Greater Israel” discourse, which has been evident since Oct. 7. Israeli right-wing politicians, especially the radical members of Netanyahu’s War Cabinet, talk about the expansion of Israel’s territory. Historically entrenched in Türkiye and the region, the discourse of Israel’s so-called “holy land” has been reinforced in today’s Turkish strategic culture.
Israel’s expansionist policies and aggressive moves in the region require Türkiye to reconsider its security and defense doctrine. Erdoğan’s rhetoric should not be considered merely as domestic political leverage; rather, it is a reflection of Türkiye’s changing security paradigm.
Türkiye’s military, security and intelligence community must rethink how to deal with the new wave of insecurity in the Middle East. The escalating military tensions between Israel and Iran, Israel’s aggressive policies in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, and the U.S.’ strategic ambiguity make it imperative to rethink Türkiye’s security and defense doctrine. The Turkish strategic community should understand that a defense-based security doctrine will not be enough to cope with the new wave of Middle Eastern insecurity and should develop a policy that will reinforce Türkiye’s strategic deterrence and resilience.
