The terror-free Türkiye process has completed its first year. Discussions about the process resurfaced after Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli shook hands with Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) deputies in Parliament last October and subsequently issued a call to the PKK's leader.
In December, the organization’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan, declared he was ready to make such a call. By May, he issued a call for a “dissolution and disarmament meeting” for the PKK. These statements could be read as preparations for relaunching the process.
Öcalan’s call, followed by the PKK’s announcement that it would declare its “dissolution,” marked the first critical turning point. In July, the PKK held a ceremony to begin burning its weapons and announced that disarmament would continue – a second milestone.
Following the PKK’s start of disarmament, Parliament established a commission to oversee the process. The commission began hearing from state officials, political parties and representatives of all sectors of society.
From the outset, two main axes shaped the debate. First, the content of commission statements was debated in the public sphere, sometimes almost treated as if the process depended entirely on its outcomes. Especially, some PKK and DEM Party actors tied the progress of the process to the commission’s output, which was a problematic approach.
The second axis was the linkage of the terror-free Türkiye process to the YPG/SDF, the Syrian branch of the PKK. The PKK and DEM Party circles began portraying Türkiye’s insistence on the YPG/SDF’s participation in Syria’s new political framework as problematic. They criticized Türkiye’s efforts to ensure Syrian unity and inclusiveness. In addition, some DEM Party figures ignored the early emphasis on careful language, putting forward demands unrelated to ending terror and making provocative statements that agitated public sensitivities – both in the Parliament and Diyarbakır. This atmosphere fueled public doubts about the process, halting the early momentum of support.
Ultimately, both the continuation of the PKK’s disarmament in the field and a recalibration of some DEM Party politicians’ stances are essential. Terrorism must be distinguished from the Kurdish question.
Responding to Öcalan’s call, the PKK declared it would completely withdraw from Türkiye. This is an important development, a sign that the “wheel of the bicycle” is indeed turning. A cautious optimism about the future remains.
To prevent manipulation or sabotage, it is crucial not to forget the initial spirit and past experiences. Sensitivity about language must continue. Success also depends on clearly separating the terrorism problem from the Kurdish question, rather than allowing them to become intertwined.
Steps to end terrorism and relevant legal arrangements must not be conflated with controversial debates about the Kurdish issue. Of course, once terrorism ends, democratic reforms can be discussed within democratic politics. But making such reforms a precondition for ending terrorism would be a grave mistake. Similarly, the DEM Party’s attempt to hold the entire process hostage to Öcalan-related demands is irresponsible. The DEM Party should act responsibly to facilitate, not complicate, the process.
At the same time, the disarmament process must not be entirely tied to the commission’s recommendations. While its proposals are important, legislation will ultimately be enacted by Parliament.
Public support is crucial. Society must see that disarmament continues on the ground. The original commitment that “there will be no bargaining” and the sensitivity to public sentiment remain valid. Finally, the balance must be carefully struck between moving too hastily and dragging the process out.
