Tehran’s miscalculation may come back to haunt it in Yemen

^{As tensions rise again in Yemen, the real story is not simply one playing out between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia. The latest developments reported by Reuters in an exclusive story point to a far more consequential equation taking shape behind the scenes: an increasingly concrete security strategy involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye.}

^{According to Reuters, Pakistan conveyed Riyadh’s message to Tehran, calling on Iran to ensure that the Houthis stop attacking Saudi Arabia. Iran responded that it does not control the Houthis. Yet, two Iranian sources cited by Reuters claim that Tehran had asked the Houthis last week to attack Saudi Arabia, promising additional funding and weapons in return. They further alleged that several commanders from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had traveled to Yemen to help coordinate the attacks.}

^{If these allegations are accurate, Iran’s strategy is fairly clear: use the Houthis to increase pressure on Riyadh and put Saudi Arabia in a more difficult position vis-à-vis Washington. But the maneuver could backfire.}

^{Rather than isolating Saudi Arabia, attacks against Riyadh are consolidating its defense coordination with Pakistan and Türkiye. Reuters reports that senior military representatives from Pakistan and Türkiye held discussions in Saudi Arabia on how a possible response should be handled. Even more significant is the reported understanding among the three countries that they will not deploy their forces into Yemeni territory. In other words, for now, the objective is not a joint ground operation in Yemen, but the collective defense of Saudi territory. That distinction is critical.}

^{The reason is that the Joint Defense Agreement signed by Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in Mecca on Aug. 7 is no longer merely a diplomatic document; it is beginning to face its first real test in an actual crisis. The agreement was built around the principle that an attack against any one of the three countries would concern the other two as well. Developments in Yemen may prove to be one of the first serious tests of that principle.}

^{Ankara does not portray the Mecca Agreement as an alliance directed against any particular country. Türkiye’s approach is to strengthen regional deterrence without being dragged into another regional war. Therefore, Türkiye’s participation in military coordination in Riyadh does not mean that Ankara is preparing to send troops to Yemen. Quite the opposite: the aim appears to be to establish a security line that deters aggression through the defense of Saudi Arabia while preventing the conflict from expanding.}

^{This is precisely where the paradox for Iran emerges. The more pressure Tehran applies to Riyadh through the Houthis, the more it risks strengthening Saudi Arabia’s security ties with Türkiye and Pakistan. In other words, pressure exerted through a proxy force may be producing the opposite of its intended effect: it is reinforcing a new form of regional solidarity.}

^{There may not yet be a NATO-style institutionalized alliance. But the fact that a collective-defense principle is beginning to operate in response to a real crisis could rapidly increase the regional weight of this emerging structure. That is why what is happening in Yemen today cannot be adequately understood simply as “the Houthis attacked and Riyadh responded.”}

^{The real question is not how much Iran’s pressure through Yemen will isolate Saudi Arabia, but how much it will push Riyadh closer to Türkiye and Pakistan.}

^{Iran’s miscalculation may come back to haunt it through the Houthis.}