European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s recent remark at an anniversary event of Die Zeit in Hamburg, “We must complete the European continent so that it does not fall under Russian, Turkish or Chinese influence. We need to think bigger and more geopolitically,” was striking, not for what is said overtly, but for what is revealed beneath the surface.
At first glance, placing Türkiye in the same category as Russia and China may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of its growing geopolitical weight over the past two decades. And indeed, it is. But that is not the core issue.
The real question is this: how does Europe justify such a framing toward a country that remains an official candidate for European Union membership, serves as the cornerstone of NATO’s southeastern flank and is even expected to host a Multinational Corps Headquarters?
The answer lies in Europe’s evolving strategic psychology.
First, Europe is grappling with its own internal fragility. Trust in the United States has eroded, relations with Russia are nearing a breaking point and competition with China is intensifying. In such a landscape, any capable actor in Europe’s periphery is no longer seen as a partner by default, but as a potential vector of influence, if not a risk. Türkiye is increasingly viewed through this lens.
Second, the meaning of enlargement has fundamentally shifted. It is no longer framed as a normative, values-driven project but rather as a tool for geopolitical consolidation. The rhetoric of “completing Europe” is, in essence, about securing and expanding spheres of influence. Türkiye, however, is the largest actor that does not neatly fit into this design, nor does it fully subscribe to it.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, is Türkiye’s transformation. Over the past 20 years, türkiye has moved beyond being a peripheral extension of the West. It has become a state that defines its own agenda, delivers outcomes on the ground and is willing to take calculated risks. This shift does not inspire admiration in Europe as much as it generates caution.
For this reason, von der Leyen’s statement should not be read as a dismissal of Türkiye. On the contrary, it is an implicit acknowledgment. Türkiye is no longer a country that can be ignored. Yet, it is also not fully accepted as part of Europe’s internal architecture. This ambiguity is precisely why it is mentioned alongside Russia and China.
Ultimately, the issue is not what Türkiye is doing but how Europe is redefining itself. And within that redefinition, Türkiye is no longer merely a candidate country. It has become a strategic equation that Europe has yet to solve.
