The terror-free initiative has occupied the central agenda of Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy for several months and is likely to remain a key issue in the near future. It is expected to be widely debated in Parliament and to continue shaping Türkiye’s relations with actors in the Middle East.
Although the ruling coalition initiated the process, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan transformed it into a “state and national project” by calling on state institutions to become involved. As a result, beyond the ruling political actors, many other stakeholders also began to take part in the process.
Parliament, which represents more than 90% of the population, established a commission, the Parliamentary Commission on National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy, within the framework of the terror-free Türkiye process. After 19 separate sessions, the commission, led by Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş, is expected to submit a report to the General Assembly.
Before submitting a final report to Parliament, the commission asked all political parties to submit their respective reports to the commission to prepare the final report. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party), Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), Republican People's Party (CHP) and New Path (Yeni Yol) Group submitted their reports to the commission.
An examination of these reports reveals a clear distinction between those prepared by the ruling coalition (the AK Party and the MHP) and those produced by the main opposition parties (the CHP and the DEM Party). While the first group specifically focuses on the process, the second group emphasizes a larger perspective. The AK Party and MHP propose a concrete roadmap for the continuation of the process. However, the DEM Party and CHP offer a large-scale political reform, repeating their overall political perspective.
On the one hand, the CHP report offers no concrete proposals regarding the implementation of the process, appearing to defer such recommendations to a later stage. Instead, the report largely reflects the party’s broader political agenda. As a result, the CHP does not articulate a clear position on the process and may shift its stance to the right or left depending on future developments.
On the other hand, the DEM Party’s report largely reflects its traditional political discourse, encompassing both the Kurdish issue and the terrorism problem. Due to its maximalist stance, the report does not facilitate the process. The party may postpone some of the content of the report to the second phase of the process, namely the political and legal phase.
The AK Party’s report, consisting of 60 pages and 15 sections, is divided into three main parts. In the first part, the AK Party addresses the background of both the terrorism and the Kurdish issues. It examines their historical evolution, outlines the party’s perspective, and lists the main concrete steps taken by AK Party governments.
The second part deals with the process itself. It first positions the terror-free initiative as a sub-project of the larger Century of Türkiye grand strategy and lays out the terms of the process. The report calls for the establishment of an oversight and confirmation mechanism, which is expected to oversee and confirm the laying down of weapons by the PKK terrorist organization.
A complete laying down of weapons is considered a “principled threshold,” after which a legal process will be initiated. The report suggests that state institutions must take necessary measures to maintain public order and government institutions must prevent any attempts to sabotage the process. Then, all related legal regulations will be made through “an independent and temporary law.”
The third part of the report focuses on the post-initiative period. The title of the related part is “post-liquidation democratization perspective.” In other words, after the successful completion of the terror-free initiative, the process for a comprehensive democratization will be initiated. The AK Party report claims that “the Kurdish issue is a test for Türkiye itself” and an issue of democratization.
The report separates the Kurdish issue from the context of terrorism. The party addressed the issue from both cultural and legal perspectives. The report envisages strengthening the foundation of democratic politics, expanding the field of legitimate political debate and ending the influence of internal and external tutelage centers.
Similarly, the MHP report has also drawn up a specific roadmap for the resolution of the terror-free initiative. The report, which foresees a law specific to the process that should be enacted, envisages a three-stage process: disarmament, legal process and rehabilitation. The MHP report calls for an independent law for the “right of hope,” release of political prisoners and termination of the trusteeship practice.
Overall, it is evident that political actors approach the issue from four distinct perspectives. The first group adopts a “let the problem be solved, whoever solves it” stance. Since coming to power, AK Party governments have pursued a “service policy," taking numerous significant measures to rid the country of terrorism and solve the Kurdish issue.
Similarly, the MHP, the junior partner of the ruling coalition, seems ready to take all necessary steps to resolve the issue, being ready to meet and negotiate the process with all sides. Except for some red lines regarding the territorial integrity and political independence of the country, the MHP has no preconditions about the process.
The second group holds the view of “Let the problem be solved, but only if Erdoğan does not solve it.” Certain opposition parties seek to prevent the ruling coalition, particularly Erdoğan, from claiming credit for the process. Therefore, they may oppose the initiative to block the ruling coalition from benefiting from the process. In other words, they prioritize their own or their group’s interests at the expense of national interests. However, they struggle to provide a coherent rationale for their opposition. While their political rhetoric may express support for the process, they continue to explore alternative means to hinder its progress.
The third group argues, “Let the problem be solved, but only if I solve it.” Some political actors seek to claim the rewards of the process and therefore do not want any other actor to resolve the issue. Similar to the second group, they prioritize their individual or group interests over national interests. They also face difficulties in justifying their claims, as society can impose political costs on them. The costs of ongoing terrorism to the state and society remain very high.
The fourth group asserts, “Let the problem never be solved.” No mainstream political actors reject the resolution of the issue, but some small far-right, ultranationalist, and racist groups immediately sprang into action. The higher the probability of the process’s success, the louder their voices become. In this context, these politically motivated groups are attempting to incite different segments of society against the Kurds. State institutions must take measures to counter these misleading groups and limit their influence on society.
