Many academic works chronicling the political history of the 21st century will likely treat Oct. 7, 2023, as a pivotal turning point when examining political developments in the Middle East and beyond. The war that began in Gaza subsequently extended to Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iraq and ultimately to Iran through the 12-Day War. The second war, launched on Feb. 28, 2026, revived the tensions and confrontations that the first had left unresolved, forcing a fresh reckoning.
On the other hand, the 2026 war has already produced effects that transcend the region, given the damage it has inflicted on energy infrastructure and the global economy, though the destruction can still be said to fall below its full potential. Throughout this process, the countries that have sustained the most severe damage in this expanding war are the Gulf states, effectively sacrificed by the U.S. The reality is that contemporary defense technologies have proven less effective in protecting the Gulf states than they have Israel, and the U.S. has visibly struggled to defend even its own bases.
According to nuclear strategist William W. Kaufmann, three fundamental data points matter when a country attempts to read the intentions of its adversaries: the rhetoric and behavior of government officials, the attitudes of domestic and allied publics, and finally, the relevant country’s past performance or track record as a basis for comparison. Viewed through this lens, Israel’s sensitivity toward Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs became distinctly pronounced in the early 2000s. In parallel, a potential operation targeting Iran’s nuclear program has been on Israel’s agenda since 2006. When we incorporate the asymmetric groups in the region into this framework as the central preoccupation of the last 15 years, it becomes clear that we are witnessing developments that should have been anticipated for quite some time.
At a more macro and independent level, the U.S. and Israel view regime change in Iran as the shortest and least costly path to reshaping the region's security and strategic energy equation in their favor, a golden key that would unlock multiple objectives at once. The practical implications of Israeli and Iranian security doctrines reinforce this calculus. Since the invasion of Iraq, Iran has expanded its influence from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean through non-state actors, nourishing them with ballistic missile and drone know-how while effectively encircling Israel from Syria to Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. The final layer of Iran's defense was the targeting of Gulf states and their production facilities, countries that produce more than 20% of the world's oil and natural gas supply, under the pretext of the presence of American bases. With the striking of Gulf states and the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s asymmetric warfare was fully brought into play.
The critical factor in the expansion of Israel is its own national security doctrine. Particularly after Oct. 7, Israel grounded its deterrence on kinetic strikes across the region, seeking, as previously noted, to carve through the “hostile wall” of state and non-state actors surrounding it, and to establish a network of relationships with strategically selected actors for this purpose. This dynamic is what causes Israel and Iran to sustain the conflict beyond their own borders. When Gulf actors hosting U.S. bases are factored into this equation, tracking the missiles falling across a wide area from Irbil to the Gulf acquires even greater significance.
The fundamental objective of the U.S. and Israel in initiating the war is to resolve multiple problems in the region with minimal effort and cost. The shortest route to that end is the fall of the regime. It is possible to state, however, that achieving this objective through the war, as it currently stands, involves considerable difficulties.
Following the destruction suffered by Gulf states, the war has intensified further. As matters stand, the prospect of triggering a new popular uprising in a post-war scenario appears to be a weakening possibility. In this context, the absence of an uprising against the regime makes discussing a third war exceedingly difficult.
Two critical issues, moreover, carry very serious consequences for Israel’s management of the war against Iran. The first is Hezbollah’s capacity, and the second is Iran’s missile inventory. Both Hezbollah’s attacks targeting Israel’s north and the scale of damage that Iran has inflicted inside Israel have reached a seriously critical level, a trajectory that has already begun to exceed the government’s capacity to manage.
Consequently, it can be said that the risk of the regime in Iran reconsolidating itself is very much on the table. Against this backdrop, it does not appear feasible for the region, or indeed the world, to endure yet another war, given that the destruction caused by the current conflict continues to accumulate and grow.
By any reasonable and rational assessment, physically reopening the Strait of Hormuz could take months, if not years, during which time the Gulf’s petroleum infrastructure may sustain severe damage. Even if the regime in Iran were to fall, the risk to the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf oil infrastructure could persist for years.
The sole question here is how far Iran will be pushed. Should pressure on the regime intensify, the region and the global economy can expect exceedingly difficult days ahead, as this is a problem far too large to be resolved simply by putting boots on the ground in Iran or by degrading Iran's A2/AD capabilities along its Persian Gulf coastline.
As of March 23, 2026, certain remarks attributed to Netanyahu in the Israeli press reflect his frustration with what he regards as Mossad's flawed assessment that the regime would unravel. This is a predictable reflex from a politician of Netanyahu's caliber: shifting the burden from his own shoulders onto the bureaucracy as elections approach is, for him, a matter of habit.
Ultimately, the war is not proceeding as Israel and the U.S. had envisioned. Absorbing an economic cost that would reverberate across the entire world in order to bring down the regime represents an extraordinarily risky proposition
