A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on Sept. 30, 2026, for the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA) railway project marks a new stage in Central Asia's search for access to the sea. Covering the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan route, the project aims to connect the region to Pakistan's ports of Karachi and Gwadar.
Under the agreement, the parties will conduct technical and economic studies, assess the feasibility of railway infrastructure and related facilities, and establish a joint working group to evaluate the project's technical, economic and financial dimensions. This stage indicates that the project has moved from political commitment toward an assessment of its practical viability. However, the document does not yet set out a definitive construction timetable, total project cost, or a finalized financing package.
According to Kazakhstan's statements, CASA is expected to carry up to 10 million tons of cargo annually to Pakistani ports, offering an important indicator of the project's economic potential. However, CASA's real economic value will be determined by the route's competitiveness in terms of cost, transit time and security. For the landlocked states of Central Asia, the fundamental question is which route can deliver their cargo to global markets, at what cost and under which political conditions.
Treating CASA as a railway investment would be insufficient to explain its place in Central Asia's foreign trade and foreign policy calculations. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are seeking to develop transportation links in different directions and create more options for trade routes. The southern route is becoming an important part of this effort. The objective is to build a transportation network that allows foreign trade to be distributed across different routes rather than relying on existing connections alone.
Central Asia's turn toward the south is rooted in the transportation challenges created by geography. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have no direct access to the world's seas. As a result, the region's foreign trade depends on railway and road links passing through neighboring countries. Diversifying transportation routes is emerging as one of the main tools for reducing the economic impact of this geographical disadvantage.
CASA seeks to add a southern direction to this effort. For Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, access to Pakistani ports would provide a new trade route to the Indian Ocean. Connections through Karachi and Gwadar could make Pakistan a more important transit hub for Central Asian maritime trade. If such a connection becomes operational, it could expand the region's ability to choose between different routes for its exports and imports.
One of CASA's key components, the Trans-Afghan railway, is important for the same reason. The project, being developed by Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, aims to connect Afghanistan to Pakistan through Termez. The Mazar-i-Sharif-Torkham section, one of the new railway segments planned in Afghanistan, is expected to stretch for approximately 760 kilometers. Feasibility work began in 2025, while the railway is expected to have a transport capacity of around 20 million tons. According to new estimates released by Uzbekistan in June 2026, the project's cost has risen above $7 billion.
Rising costs directly raise questions about CASA's economic viability. Building the railway represents one part of the challenge. Transport costs must remain competitive, border crossings must operate smoothly and uninterrupted access to Pakistani ports must be ensured. Rail transport offers advantages for moving large volumes of cargo over long distances on a regular basis. Yet these advantages can quickly weaken if delays at border crossings or security-related disruptions occur.
Central Asia's search for southern connections is not limited to the Pakistan route. Kazakhstan has expressed its willingness to participate in projects involving Afghanistan's Turgundi-Herat route, while Uzbekistan is working on a connection between Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat. Alongside Iran's Khaf-Herat railway connection, plans for the Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif line could strengthen the prospects for an alternative southern connection through Afghanistan.
What these developments have in common is the Central Asian states' search for multiple options rather than dependence on a single southern route. The ability to choose between Pakistani ports, connections to the Gulf through Iran and existing routes toward China could expand the room for maneuver of regional states in their trade policies. Greater diversity in transportation infrastructure could also make foreign trade decisions more resilient to political risks.
Russia and China are also engaging with the emerging transportation networks. Moscow's interest in using the Trans-Afghan route for its own freight transport indicates that the project could develop into a trade corridor open to different actors. Progress on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway could also bring Central Asia's eastern and southern connections closer together. These developments, however, should not overshadow the Central Asian states' own efforts to expand their transportation options.
CASA's most serious challenge is that the route passes through Afghanistan. Building railway infrastructure does not guarantee that the line will operate safely and without disruption. Afghanistan's political and security conditions are becoming a direct part of the project's economic calculations. Failure to establish lasting security along the route could increase investment and insurance costs.
Tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan pose a particularly important risk to CASA. Border closures, clashes and disruptions to transit trade could directly affect the railway's transit times and costs. The renewed escalation in fighting between Pakistan and Afghanistan in early October 2026 demonstrated how critical the security dimension of a transportation corridor extending to Pakistan can be.
The challenge also extends beyond the physical security of the railway. Customs procedures need to operate smoothly, common procedures for border crossings need to be established, and transit cargo needs to be protected as far as possible from political tensions. Otherwise, a technically completed railway may fail to become a functioning and uninterrupted trade corridor. The predictability of Afghanistan's transit regime will therefore be one of the factors determining CASA's economic value.
Central Asian states' diplomatic and regional initiatives toward Afghanistan also cannot be considered separately from transportation projects. The regional mechanisms established by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on Afghanistan demonstrate the need to address security and economic connectivity together. Direct engagement between regional states and Afghanistan could provide a diplomatic basis for reducing dependence on external actors in managing security challenges.
Another issue facing CASA is the long-term operating framework for the route. A corridor gains economic value when cargo owners regard it as reliable. If transport companies cannot rely on predictable transit times, costs and security conditions, they may opt for alternative routes even when those routes are more expensive. CASA's competitiveness will therefore be measured by how consistently the entire transit chain operates.
UAE involvement in the project is also important in terms of financing and infrastructure capacity. Abu Dhabi is not located along the route, yet as a party to the memorandum, it stands out as an actor that can contribute its experience in investment and logistics. However, existing documents do not specify a UAE investment amount, making it too early to describe the UAE's role as a confirmed financing commitment.
Ultimately, CASA matters because it turns Central Asia's search for access to the south into a concrete transportation project. A railway reaching Pakistani ports could provide regional states with a new option for their foreign trade. Turning this option into a genuine strategic advantage, however, will depend on whether the route can remain economically competitive and sustainable from a security perspective.
