As 2025 drew to a close, energy relations between Russia and Türkiye have shifted beyond the traditional supplier-consumer framework. They are now positioned at a fragile threshold where geopolitical balancing and commercial pragmatism increasingly intersect. Europe’s post-Ukraine war disengagement from Russian gas has pushed Moscow to rely more heavily on a limited number of large, infrastructure-rich markets such as Türkiye. At the same time, Ankara, supported by expanding LNG capacity, a more diversified supply portfolio, and its ambition to become an energy trading hub, has entered a phase of redefining the rigidity of long-term gas contracts. This condition of mutual necessity, as the parties move toward 2026, compels them into a flexible, interest-based equilibrium that allows neither a full strategic rupture nor a return to the former structure of dependency.
For many years, Türkiye has exhibited a high degree of dependence on Russia for natural gas imports. Particularly during the 2010s, the share of Russian gas in Türkiye’s total imports reached the range of 40%-45% and in some years approached nearly half of the total supply. This period reflected a balance in which long-term, oil-indexed contracts with take-or-pay obligations, primarily via the Western Line and Blue Stream, formed the backbone of Türkiye’s supply security.
By the mid-2020s, however, this structure had changed markedly. With the expansion of LNG infrastructure, investments in floating storage and regasification units, the growing role of Azerbaijani gas, and improved access to spot markets, Russia’s share in Türkiye’s total natural gas imports declined to approximately 35%-38% by 2025. In absolute terms, Türkiye continues to import roughly 15 to 18 billion cubic meters of gas annually from Russia, which still positions Russia as Türkiye’s largest single supplier. Yet this trade no longer represents a one-sided dependency. Instead, Russian gas has become a commercially and geopolitically managed component within Türkiye’s increasingly diversified energy portfolio. This transformation clearly reflects Türkiye’s transition from dependency to balance, and from long-term obligation to selective pragmatism in its energy relations with Russia.
When examined more closely, Berlin’s decision to terminate Russian gas imports emerged not only as a strategic choice but also as a forced rupture. In the initial phase, physical gas flows were cut, followed by the rapid commissioning of LNG terminals at unprecedented speed, alongside the temporary retention of coal and even nuclear power plants within the energy system. On the industrial side, this transition resulted in production declines, permanent capacity losses in certain sectors, and persistently high energy costs. Energy-intensive industrial firms such as BASF shifted investments outside Europe, while the German economy hovered near stagnation during the 2023 to 2024 period. This experience clearly demonstrated that the economic cost of exiting Russian gas was substantial for Germany. Although Europe’s stance on abandoning Russian gas appears resolute at the level of political rhetoric, in practice, it has taken the form of a restructured dependency rather than a complete disengagement.
Following the Ukraine-Russia war, the European Union largely removed Russian pipeline gas from its energy system. However, this step did not imply a reduction in energy consumption. Instead, it resulted in an aggressive entry into the global LNG market. International Energy Agency data indicate that Europe’s exit from Russian gas was achieved primarily through source substitution rather than demand elimination. While total gas demand declined, LNG’s share within the system reached historical highs. In this context, the clearest beneficiary of the war has been the global LNG market, where geopolitical risk premiums have been priced in, and long-term contractual structures have regained prominence.
Between 2022 and 2024, the United States, in particular, along with Qatar and other LNG exporters, secured a lasting position in the European market, with both spot and long-term contracts expanding rapidly. While this development enhanced short-term supply security for Europe, it also resulted in higher energy costs and weakened industrial competitiveness. Consequently, Europe’s claim of abandoning Russian gas on moral and strategic grounds struggles to withstand closer scrutiny when the high premiums paid for LNG and the absence of a comprehensive ban on Russian LNG are taken into account. While pipeline gas is rejected, the continued presence of the same molecule in LNG form or through indirect trade channels demonstrates that EU policy has been driven more by crisis management considerations than by ideological consistency.
Could these balances shift rapidly under a potential peace scenario? Proposals such as the intermittently voiced Peace Plan associated with Trump, or the prospect of a broader U.S.-Russia understanding, could introduce significant disruptions into European gas markets. In such a scenario, the gradual and limited reintroduction of Russian pipeline gas could temporarily soften LNG demand. However, the critical constraint lies in the extensive LNG infrastructure investments and long-term contracts undertaken by Europe after 2022, which make a full return to the previous system increasingly unlikely. In other words, even if peace were to increase gas flows, it would not guarantee LNG’s exit from the system.
Looking ahead, three main scenarios stand out. In the first scenario, the continuation of the war, whether prolonged or at low intensity, allows the LNG market to retain its current strength, with Europe continuing to secure supply through LNG despite high costs. In the second scenario, a limited peace and partial normalization occur, enabling Russian gas to become accessible again for certain countries, while LNG remains within the system as a price-balancing and complementary element. In the third and more radical scenario, a comprehensive geopolitical settlement is achieved. In this case, gas prices could decline, but Russia is unlikely to regain its former central role, as Europe’s energy security strategy is no longer built around reliance on a single supplier.
By 2026, Europe is expected to complete its de facto and de jure disengagement from Russian pipeline gas. This development should not be assumed to exert a direct or unilateral impact on Türkiye-Russia energy relations. From Türkiye’s perspective, by 2026, its energy portfolio will be structured around controlled diversification rather than the abrupt rupture model pursued by Europe after 2022. The expansion of LNG capacity, the activation of long-term agreements with suppliers such as the U.S. and Qatar, and the contribution of domestic production from the Sakarya Gas Field will render Russian gas no longer indispensable for Türkiye, while still preventing its complete exclusion. Accordingly, Türkiye-Russia energy relations are likely to be conducted through shorter-term commercial arrangements characterized by greater volume and price flexibility, rather than rigid long-term contracts.
At the geopolitical level, Europe’s exit from Russian gas assigns Türkiye a balancing role. As one of the few actors deepening energy integration with the West while avoiding a complete rupture with Russia, Ankara will continue to seek to keep energy trade outside rigid political bloc alignments. While this position grants Türkiye additional diplomatic maneuvering space, it also necessitates a more cautious policy approach, as Europe’s heightened sensitivity regarding energy security will lead to closer scrutiny of Türkiye’s relations with Russia. Türkiye’s chosen path clearly diverges from the sharp and costly rupture experienced by the EU, particularly in the German case. While strengthening energy integration with the West, Ankara avoids a discourse that fully excludes Russia, instead positioning energy trade within the realm of commercial pragmatism rather than geopolitical polarization. U.S. LNG and potential upstream investments thus emerge not as overnight substitutes for Russian gas, but as complementary instruments that manage and distribute dependency more effectively.
