In recent years, the name of the Germany-based company SEFE, Securing Energy for Europe, has been heard increasingly often. The reasons behind this visibility are open to serious debate. Its more frequent appearance through natural gas agreements with Azerbaijan and Türkiye is not coincidental. This rise in visibility is a direct result of the structural transformation taking place in the European energy market and Germany’s energy security strategy. The steps taken by SEFE should be understood not only as commercial agreements but also as geopolitical and strategic repositioning efforts.
Following the Russia-Ukraine war, Europe’s decision to rapidly reduce its dependence on Russian gas forced Germany to fundamentally restructure its energy supply chain. What stands out in this process is that the former Gazprom Germania, taken under state control and restructured under the name SEFE, became less a conventional commercial company and more a strategic instrument for ensuring Germany’s energy supply security.
Public debate has repeatedly raised a central question about the European energy crisis unfolding in the fate of SEFE. Was Gazprom’s presence in Europe truly brought to an end, or was the company effectively seized and forced into collapse? The answer points to an energy security intervention that is far more complex than a classic nationalization story.
SEFE was not technically bankrupt in 2022. However, it had been pushed into a business model that was no longer sustainable in practice. At that time, Gazprom Germania was one of the most important commercial arms of Russia based on Gazprom in Europe, with a gas portfolio largely dependent on Russian pipeline gas. Sanctions imposed after the Russia-Ukraine war and the subsequent political rupture rendered the company’s main supply channel inoperable almost overnight.
Despite this, SEFE’s contractual obligations toward German industry, municipalities and electricity producers remained in place. At this point, the situation facing the company was clear. While continuing to sell gas under long-term contracts, SEFE was forced to procure gas from the spot market at extremely high prices. This created a rapidly growing financing gap on the balance sheet. According to German authorities, without state intervention, SEFE’s collapse would not have been limited to a single company, but would have triggered a chain reaction in the German gas market. For this reason, Germany’s actions were shaped not as a corporate rescue operation, but as a compulsory intervention aimed at protecting energy supply security.
In April 2022, the appointment of a trustee to the company’s management ended Gazprom’s effective control. Although Gazprom remained a shareholder on paper, all management authority was transferred to the German state. The state then provided SEFE with direct capital injections and credit guarantees. These funds were not transferred to Gazprom, but were used entirely to manage liabilities and secure gas supplies from the market.
In November 2022, the process resulted in full nationalization. Gazprom’s shares were declared legally and economically worthless and written down to zero, making Germany the sole owner of the company. Germany did not pay compensation for these shares, arguing that a structure unable to survive without state support had no market value. The takeover, therefore, took place in the form of an uncompensated seizure. Moscow described this decision as illegal nationalization. However, sanctions, wartime conditions and European energy security considerations prevented Germany from reversing course.
After the takeover, SEFE’s role changed fundamentally. The company was no longer a trading arm based on Russian gas, but became a strategic instrument of Germany’s energy policy. What made 2022 a crisis year was the fact that SEFE relied less on building new long-term supply agreements and more on rapid substitution purchases to meet existing obligations. The strategy was not to secure the cheapest portfolio, but to find gas and deliver it. This distinction matters because after the takeover, the type, duration and geography of SEFE’s agreements changed significantly.
Short-term profit maximization gave way to supply continuity, portfolio diversification and price stability. SEFE turned toward long-term contracts with non-Russian suppliers. Its main orientation became the construction of a diversified supply basket composed of multiple sources and different product types. Two main pillars emerged within this approach: pipeline gas within Europe and global LNG contracts. On the pipeline gas and hub-based supply side, the most concrete example is the agreement with ConocoPhillips. SEFE signed a long-term contract covering up to 9 billion cubic meters of natural gas over 10 years, with deliveries starting from various European trading hubs. Unlike the sudden substitution need of 2022, by 2024, SEFE began spreading price and volume risk over time, creating a more manageable portfolio. This shift also enabled SEFE to conclude state-supported and politically prioritized long-term agreements.
The Azerbaijan corridor carries a clear geopolitical dimension. SEFE signed a 10-year offtake agreement with SOCAR, under which annual volumes are set to rise gradually to 15 terawatt hours, approximately 1.5 billion cubic meters. At a time when non-Russian pipeline gas options are regaining importance, this agreement adds an additional pillar to European supply security through the Southern Gas Corridor. Official sources reported that from January 2026, SOCAR began physical deliveries to Germany and Austria via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline.
The long term gas agreements with SOCAR are particularly significant. Azerbaijan is not only an alternative supplier for Europe, but one of the most stable sources of non-Russian pipeline gas. Gas delivered through the Southern Gas Corridor, especially via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, has gained strategic value for major consumers such as Germany. SEFE’s relationship with Azerbaijan reflects Europe’s diversification strategy without fully abandoning pipeline-based gas.
Another reason for SEFE’s growing visibility is its direct and indirect energy links with Türkiye. Türkiye serves as a key transit country for Azerbaijani gas and plays an increasingly central role in the European energy landscape due to its LNG infrastructure and flexible gas trading capacity. SEFE’s monitoring of pipeline systems crossing Türkiye aligns with Ankara’s ambition to become a regional energy hub. SEFE’s rising prominence stems not from the number of agreements it has signed, but from their strategic nature. Long-term agreements with Azerbaijan, Türkiye’s transit role, and Germany’s state-led reconstruction of its energy security architecture in the post Russian period have turned SEFE into a visible actor in European energy policy. For this reason, SEFE is likely to remain a frequent subject in discussions on the European natural gas market in the period ahead.
