The emergence of a multipolar world order 2.0 represents a major transformation in global politics, particularly across Eurasia, where power dynamics are no longer shaped by a single hegemon or a rigid bipolar structure. Instead, intensified competition between the U.S. and China increasingly defines the international environment, especially in regions occupied by strategically located middle and small powers. This competition generates both opportunities and constraints for third-party actors, compelling them to balance external pressures while preserving autonomy. Within this context, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) has gained growing geopolitical relevance as a regional platform linking Turkic-speaking countries across Central Asia, the Caucasus and Anatolia.
In 2025, two-way merchandise trade between China and the five Central Asian states exceeded $106.3 billion, marking a new historical peak and expanding by approximately 12% year-on-year. China’s exports to Central Asia in 2025 reached about $71.2 billion, while imports from the region stood at $35.1 billion, underscoring both booming demand and structural asymmetries in regional trade ties. For the first time, China emerged as the largest trading partner for all five Central Asian countries in 2025, overtaking Russia and other traditional partners.
In contrast, trade volumes between the U.S. and Central Asian states remained modest in 2025. For example, total bilateral trade between the U.S. and Kazakhstan was around $2.1 billion in the first eight months, contracting compared to prior years.
Eurasia has become a central arena of U.S.-China rivalry due to its role as a crossroads for trade, energy flows and emerging technologies. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) seeks to deepen economic connectivity through large-scale infrastructure investments, while the U.S. promotes alternative frameworks such as the Blue Dot Network, emphasizing transparency and sustainability. For Turkic states, these competing initiatives create space to attract investment and diversify partnerships, but they also raise risks of economic dependency, political alignment pressure and security dilemmas. The OTS, therefore, occupies a delicate position in this evolving multipolar landscape.
Geopolitically and geoeconomically, OTS member states occupy the heart of Eurasia, a region where the interests of major powers such as China, Russia and Iran intersect. The Central Asian and Caspian regions are rich in energy resources and positioned along critical transportation routes linking East Asia to Europe. In this environment, the OTS seeks to enhance regional connectivity through projects such as the Middle Corridor, which connects Central Asia to Europe via the Caspian Sea and Türkiye. The importance of this route has increased following the Russia-Ukraine war, which undermined the reliability of northern transit corridors. Energy infrastructure projects, including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) pipelines, further enhance the strategic value of the OTS geography by enabling the transport of Caspian and Central Asian resources to European markets.
In addition to trade volume growth, China has been financing key overland infrastructure such as the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, backed by a $4.7 billion financing package including a $2.3 billion, 35-year China EximBank loan, which aims to enhance cargo throughput and diversify transit routes along the Eurasian corridor.
Unlike China’s state-bank-driven infrastructure model, the U.S. does not directly finance large-scale railway corridors in Central Asia through long-term sovereign loans. Instead, Washington relies on instruments such as the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which prioritize private-sector investment mobilization, governance reform and development grants rather than strategic transport corridor construction. While the G-7-backed Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) aims to mobilize up to $600 billion globally, U.S. engagement in Central Asia remains focused on energy transition, critical minerals and digital connectivity rather than railway-based transit integration. This structural difference highlights that the U.S.-China competition in the region is not merely geopolitical but reflects fundamentally distinct financing architectures.
From the U.S. perspective, engagement with the OTS is largely indirect. Washington does not treat the organization as a primary policy target, but views greater cooperation among Turkic states as beneficial insofar as it reduces their dependence on Russia and China. Through mechanisms such as the C5 1 platform, the U.S. seeks to strengthen bilateral ties with Central Asian republics. American analysts argue that supporting Türkiye-led connectivity initiatives, including the Middle Corridor, aligns with U.S. strategic interests by diversifying trade routes and limiting rival powers’ leverage. U.S. backing for Trans-Caspian energy projects and openness to Türkiye’s defense exports to Central Asia similarly reflect this approach. At the same time, Washington’s support remains conditional, as demonstrated by cautious reactions to the inclusion of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as an OTS observer due to existing U.N. resolutions.
China’s approach to the OTS is shaped by both geographical proximity and security concerns. Central Asia lies at the core of China’s western strategic environment and constitutes a key component of the BRI’s China-Central/West Asia Economic Corridor. Beijing has invested heavily in infrastructure and trade networks across the region and is therefore attentive to any development that could constrain its influence.
The broader U.S.-China rivalry nonetheless places the OTS in a complex strategic environment. Washington views the organization as a potential means of filling power vacuums in Eurasia, while Beijing remains cautious of its long-term implications. This dynamic affects internal decision-making within the OTS, as member states maintain varying levels of economic dependence and political alignment with major powers. As a result, achieving consensus on sensitive geopolitical issues remains challenging. Most OTS members, therefore, pursue multi-vector foreign policies, seeking to balance relations with the U.S., China, Russia and other actors while preserving strategic autonomy.
This competitive setting generates several risks for the OTS. At the same time, intensified great-power competition enhances the bargaining power of OTS members by expanding their range of strategic options. If managed carefully, this environment allows Turkic states to benefit simultaneously from China’s economic initiatives and from cooperation with the United States and the West in areas such as security, energy and digital governance.
In conclusion, the OTS occupies a nuanced position at the intersection of U.S.-China rivalry in a multipolar Eurasia. China exports capital through state-backed credit tied to physical connectivity. The U.S. exports standards, governance frameworks and selective private investment. While Washington perceives the OTS as a useful, albeit indirect, strategic platform and Beijing approaches it with cautious scrutiny, the organization’s future effectiveness depends on its ability to maintain internal cohesion and strategic balance. By leveraging shared cultural ties and geographic advantages without succumbing to external domination, the OTS has the potential to emerge as a meaningful regional actor that shapes, rather than merely absorbs, the dynamics of the evolving multipolar order.
