Türkiye's growing humanitarian and strategic involvement in Somalia, especially through the recent oil and gas exploration, is one of the most significant developments in the quickly changing geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa region. Despite widespread disinformation and misleading narratives about the benefit-sharing mechanism of the Somali resources and geopolitical competition, it is crucial to acknowledge the development possibilities and potential inherent in this diplomatic collaboration, which Somalia will benefit from.
Through the ongoing oil and gas explorations, Türkiye can unlock Somalia's abundant untapped natural resources and encourage economic growth, promoting regional stability. In addition, this cooperation gives Ankara a strategic position and role at the nexus of major international trade routes that converge in the Bab-el Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden.
Somalia is one of Africa's most resource-rich but undeveloped nations. Efforts to profit from the nation's substantial natural resources have been hampered by political instability, decades of civil war and governance issues that have bedeviled Somalia. Somalia's offshore oil and gas prospects are particularly promising among these resources, alongside its blue-economy resources. According to estimates, these resource deposits might compete with other significant African producers and cover tens of thousands of square kilometers of Somali territorial waters and onshore basins.
However, Somalia's fragile institutional structures and security conditions have discouraged international investors for years. An important turning point is Türkiye's entry into this field, through agreements with Somalia that give the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) the opportunity to explore and develop oil and gas fields both onshore and offshore. Türkiye's dedication to this resource exploration is demonstrated by the arrival of its seismic research vessel, Oruç Reis, in Somalia to carry out seismic surveys in Somali waters.
The revenues and income from oil and gas production could give Somalia a financial and budgetary capacity if these discoveries are successful and managed well. This revenue might support expenditures in vital fields that have been underdeveloped and unfunded for decades, such as infrastructure, healthcare, security and education.
The comprehensive and strategic nature of Türkiye's engagement with Somalia since 2011 sets it apart from conventional resource extraction agreements. Beyond hydrocarbons, Ankara is also involved in capacity-building efforts, including security cooperation, education, social work and humanitarian aid. Türkiye has made major contributions to developing human capital in Somalia over the last 15 years by building schools, hospitals and vocational training facilities.
Over the years, Türkiye has given Somali security personnel military training and assistance, which is crucial for maintaining a secure environment for commercial activity growth. Al-Shabaab and other terrorist organizations have long destabilized Somalia and impeded development efforts; this security alliance helps combat these dangers and relatively stabilize Somalia.
The interconnectedness of development and security is recognized by Türkiye's partnership model, which integrates economic, social, and security capacity-building. Peace and stability, which in turn call for strong social infrastructure and competent security institutions, are essential for economic growth and stability in Somalia.
The wider geopolitical struggles in the Horn of Africa, which have drawn interest from various international and regional players, invariably collide with Türkiye's expanding influence in Somalia and beyond. Important sea lanes for international trade, oil supplies, and naval operations include the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden corridors, which are located close to Somalia's coast and are envisioned as strategic geopolitical capital by regional and international powers.
Recently, the power dynamics in the region have been altered by Türkiye's growing participation in Somalia. Through military outposts, subsidies and investments, countries such as China, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Western countries have all attempted to increase their influence in Somalia and the region. The rise of Türkiye as a significant ally gives Mogadishu more diplomatic and support options, giving Somalia more options in juggling conflicting interests in this geopolitical chessboard.
But tensions are also created by this geopolitical competition. Türkiye's increasing prominence is seen by several regional players as a threat to their established zones of influence in the Horn of Africa. For instance, the Gulf states have historically maintained strong military and commercial relations with Somalia. Türkiye's expanding position across the region makes these interactions more difficult.
Türkiye's involvement in Somalia could recalibrate the international powers' security and diplomatic approaches to the Horn of Africa as regional geopolitical competition increases. Western nations, which have made significant investments in counterterrorism and anti-piracy initiatives in the region, might be wary of Türkiye's new and growing regional influence.
Although Türkiye's exploration of oil and gas resources holds beneficial prospects for Somalis, it also brings up significant issues about resource management, governance and transparency. Somalia must reform regulatory frameworks, bolster institutional capacity, and guarantee openness in revenue management and contract negotiations to optimize the benefits of resource revenue. As a strategic partner, Türkiye can help advance these reforms in governance and capacity-building in the oil and refinery industry.
The dangers of "resource curse" situations, where richness from natural resources does not translate into widespread prosperity but instead feeds corruption, embezzlement or conflict, are brought to light by experience from other resource-rich African nations. Vigilance, inclusive policies, and procedures to guarantee that resource income funds social services and economic diversification are crucial in this process. Somalia must avoid the “resource curse” trap as it seeks to develop.
Beyond Somalia, improved stability in the region could result from a beneficial and win-win collaboration between Türkiye, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia. Economic and social improvements reduce unemployment and poverty, two factors that fuel extremism and political violence. Greater regional cooperation might be facilitated by a more stable Somalia, which would aid in addressing issues such as infrastructural deficiencies, security threats and migration.
Furthermore, international powers interested in Africa can adopt and replicate Türkiye's integrated development model, which combines financial investment with social services and security engagements. An improvement in international collaboration would be appreciated if partnerships emphasizing capacity-building and local development replaced exploitative resource extraction prevalent in Africa.
A geopolitical and developmental humanitarianism paradigm shift in approach is occurring in the region with Türkiye's increasing engagement and investment in Somalia's oil and gas industry. With the backing of an ally that is prepared to make investments beyond hydrocarbons, Somalia has a real chance to transform its wealth of natural resources into long-term economic development.
Somalia is a vital entry point into the Horn of Africa for Türkiye, enhancing Ankara's regional clout and aspirations in Africa. Finally, I argue that the partnership with Türkiye may serve as a model for how African countries and international powers might establish fair alliances and deals, striking a balance between social development and economic opportunity, as well as between geopolitical ambition and regional stability and security.
Somalia is transitioning from an aid-dependent nation to an oil and gas-producing country, and Türkiye has played a significant strategic role in this transformation.
