The discipline of international relations is generally understood to focus on the relationships between two or more states based on notions such as defined national interests, geopolitical balances and power competition. Yet, another perspective – often overlooked but still encompassed within the discipline – is the consideration of the relationship between a state's foreign policy behavior and its internal dynamics. This perspective is particularly important for understanding why Iran chose to sit at the negotiating table with the U.S. and why it somewhat softened its rigid stance despite President Donald Trump’s domineering attitude, even though Supreme Leader Khamenei had banned negotiations with the U.S. as recently as February.
Especially in an era where global politics has largely replaced traditional international relations – an era in which not only state-level actors but also global economic forces, domestic political players, public opinion and many other actors shape outcomes, often operating through diverse cultural codes and contexts – the relationship between a state's internal and external political dynamics becomes particularly crucial. Understanding this relationship is key to grasping why the U.S. side refers to the talks as “direct” while Iran persistently describes them as “indirect.”
Since 1979, Iran’s political culture has been shaped around the notion of “resistance against U.S. arrogance.” Its diplomatic posture and tradition are rooted in a quest to be recognized not as a marginal or sidelined player in the international system, but as an equal and dignified actor. Therefore, sitting down at the negotiating table directly with the U.S. – especially after Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 – would have been a move Iran could neither explain to its domestic audience nor reconcile with its identity. If faced with another U.S. reversal similar to 2018, Iran might not have had the luxury of recovering from the resulting cognitive dissonance.
Having said that, Iran has entered into negotiations with the U.S., whether directly or indirectly. Naturally, it is important to trace the internal dynamics that have driven Iran to the negotiating table. Doing so helps us understand how urgently Iran needs a deal and to what extent it might be willing to show flexibility in the process. Iran’s need for an agreement stems broadly from problems in three interconnected areas: economic, political and social. These spheres are not isolated from one another; rather, they reinforce and influence each other. Let us now take a closer look at the challenges in each of these areas.
A widely accepted fact is that the main reason behind Iran’s long-standing economic downturn is the sanctions imposed by the U.S. and, under U.S. pressure, by other countries as well. Due to these sanctions, Iran is unable to sell its oil and is therefore deprived of billions of dollars in revenue. It cannot modernize its facilities in the energy, transportation and production sectors. Despite being one of the richest countries in the world in terms of oil and natural gas reserves, Iran faces energy shortages. This situation is increasingly worsening the daily lives of ordinary citizens. The national currency continues to lose value. People struggle to make ends meet and face growing difficulty in accessing basic necessities, an indication that the country’s reserves of political discontent are steadily filling up. To overcome its economic problems, Iran must see the sanctions lifted. An Iran that is integrated into the global economy, participates in international trade, attracts investment from around the world, and can both utilize its oil and gas reserves for domestic energy needs and sell them abroad, would be able to improve its citizens’ standard of living and reduce grievances stemming from economic hardship. Otherwise, it seems inevitable that economic weakness will translate into political and military vulnerability.
Over the past decade, Iran has experienced significant political turbulence. A series of domestic protests (such as those triggered by fuel price hikes or the Mahsa Amini case), foreign policy crises (including direct confrontations with Israel), and setbacks in regional politics (like the weakening of Hezbollah and the fall of Bashar Assad’s power in Syria) stand out as key developments. The domestic reverberations of these crises have activated political fault lines based on ethnicity, sect and gender, raising fundamental questions about the legitimacy of the political system.
Although the Iranian state has managed to weather these crises to some extent, the political and security capital it has spent in doing so has gradually depleted public consent. The election of reformist figure Masoud Pezeshkian to the presidency represents one of the state’s strategies to overcome these challenges and ease tensions in state-society relations. Pezeshkian was granted political space and a degree of political credit. He has implemented various initiatives to address discontent rooted in gender issues and identity-based grievances from Sunnis, Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs and Turks. While these efforts have somewhat eased domestic political tensions, they are unlikely to yield long-term stability unless U.S. sanctions are lifted and the regional conflict dynamics – especially the persistent threat posed by Israel – are brought under control.
For this reason, a new agreement akin to the 2015 nuclear deal is seen as essential. Such a deal could not only offer relief from sanctions but also potentially neutralize regional conflict dynamics and introduce a U.S.-backed security guarantee capable of restraining Israeli aggression.
The Iranian people are weary of the decades-long isolation their country has endured. This isolation not only limits Iranians’ connection with the outside world but also serves as a major driver of economic and political discontent. In an age defined by the communication revolution, where alternative lifestyles are encountered through social media, such isolation breeds social unrest. Moreover, it calls into question the founding narrative of the political system itself.
In 2025, it will increasingly become difficult to sustain the political culture of 1979. A new political culture must establish a connection with the needs and realities of the times. If this political-cultural transition is to be managed in a controlled manner, without harming the delicate bond between the state and society, then Iranian decision-makers must begin to open the door to an agreement that would reintegrate Iran into the global system.
Of course, negotiations are a multifaceted and multi-actor process. The counterparts, particularly the U.S., also have their own distinct motivations, and the negotiation dynamics involve numerous challenges and obstacles. However, developments so far indicate that both sides are willing to reach an agreement. This mutual willingness is undoubtedly a key factor that increases the chances of the negotiations succeeding.
