Videos of burned weapons, dozens of meetings and a barrage of statements have been indicators that the terror-free Türkiye initiative is achieving results. Since it began informally in 2024, the initiative to disarm the PKK terrorist group has been mostly secretive due to the sensitive nature of the process. This year, however, may see more steps from Türkiye, especially in terms of legislative action.
Experts say the drive toward a “terror-free” future reflects a strategic state approach that goes beyond narrow security reflexes and shouldn’t be viewed solely through a military or purely political lens.
“The strategy combines military deterrence, deepened intelligence capabilities and sustained diplomatic pressure within a multilayered security architecture. The state’s resolve is clear, public support remains strong, and terrorism has largely been reduced to near zero inside Türkiye, while efforts continue unabated to dismantle its broader ecosystem beyond the country’s territory,” associate professor Furkan Kaya from Yeditepe University told Daily Sabah.
The terror-free Türkiye initiative was launched by government ally Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli, through a landmark speech at a party meeting in November 2024. Bahçeli called upon Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed ringleader of the terrorist group, “to speak at the Parliament if required for a call of dissolution to the PKK.”
Initially ambiguous, Bahçeli’s call started a debate on the future of the PKK, which has killed thousands of people in attacks since the 1980s. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced his endorsement of the initiative, and the government subsequently paved the way for moving the initiative forward, namely by approving a rare visit to Öcalan by a delegation from the PKK-linked Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party). Though their ideologies were worlds away, Bahçeli and Öcalan found a common ground, apparently, and in February 2025, Öcalan relayed a message through the DEM Party, instructing the PKK to dissolve itself.
The PKK began disarmament last summer as part of the terror-free Türkiye initiative. In October, the group announced that all its members within Türkiye had withdrawn. After formally announcing their dissolution in May, terrorists began destroying their weapons in July, through a ceremony in northern Iraq.
Authorities and Bahçeli promote the initiative as a path forward for Türkiye, which would be liberated from the scourge of terrorism that stunted social and economic growth for decades. Aside from eliminating the need for a substantial counterterrorism budget, it will improve daily life, especially in southeastern Türkiye, where the PKK carried out attacks and sought to recruit disillusioned Kurdish youth to its campaign of terrorism.
The initiative has been unilateral so far, as officials rejected allegations that the state bargained with the PKK for disarmament. Through intelligence services, the state closely monitors the disarmament efforts in Iraq, where the PKK has hideouts.
This year, however, Türkiye may adopt new bills to facilitate the initiative. The Turkish Parliament has already started working on the process by setting up the National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Committee. Comprised of lawmakers from most parties represented at Parliament, the committee, which was founded last August, heard from everyone, from academics to families of terror victims and PKK members. Nowadays, the committee is working on the draft of a report that will serve as a guide for Parliament in case of the implementation of new bills. It will convene again this week to work on the report after parties contributing to the committee present their own reports. Almost all reports containing suggestions propose leniency in the sentencing of PKK members not involved in acts of terrorism. This gesture may further encourage the PKK to speed up the dissolution.
“In legal regulations, the core principle should be to preserve the balance between fundamental rights and freedoms and security. Within counterterrorism legislation, areas such as digital propaganda, financing and logistical support should be updated to reflect evolving threats. Clearer and more binding provisions could be introduced to prevent municipalities from establishing indirect links with terrorist organizations through civilian structures. A deterrent framework with strong judicial oversight, including the use of trustee appointments, should be maintained. The aim, however, should not be punishment, but rather the systematic severing of all forms of contact with terrorism and the prevention of any future support through a well-defined legal framework,” Kaya said.
“The process remains dynamic, and at the current stage, work is ongoing. Special legal mechanisms could be activated or temporary arrangements introduced. Initial steps may include dismantling networks that ensure organizational continuity and cutting off financial flows. The most critical issue concerns which amendments can be made under existing counterterrorism laws and how criminal liability will be defined. In addition, a series of comprehensive legal measures will be required to facilitate the reintegration of former organization members into society,” Sibel Düz, a senior researcher at Turkish think-tank Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA), said regarding the possible future steps.
One thing remains uncertain, however, in the initiative. The YPG, the Syrian wing of the PKK, has not joined the disarmament drive so far. Developments indicate that Türkiye favors the YPG’s integration into the post-Assad Syrian army if it doesn’t join the PKK to abandon arms. This became more apparent after the YPG signed a deal with the new administration in Damascus in March 2025 for integration. It was not, however, fully implemented.
The YPG controls large swathes of Syria's oil-rich north and northeast, and enjoys the support of a U.S.-led international coalition, under the pretext of a joint fight against the terrorist group Daesh.
Düz stressed the need for a combination of international and domestic pressure mechanisms capable of compelling the YPG to act, noting that, absent sustained pressure, it appears unlikely the group would, on its own initiative, transfer authority on the ground to Damascus, dissolve its armed presence, and fully integrate into a unified chain of command.
“The YPG’s insistence on maintaining a maximalist position is reinforcing the perception that the integration issue has stalled at the level of rhetoric,” Düz underlined.
On the other hand, drawing attention to the backing from U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Pentagon, Kaya asserted that “Türkiye would not allow any of the YPG to entrench itself as a 'state within a state' in Syria, particularly if U.S. support persists.”
“Since the Obama administration, the groups have received thousands of truckloads of weapons, along with financial and medical assistance,” he added.
Türkiye also closely monitors the developments in Syria regarding the security concerns and reiterates that the terrorist group should comply with the agreement, as the patience for the integration process is running out.
While arguing the regional reflections of the initiative, “the continued presence of YPG east of the Euphrates, delays in the integration process, efforts by Israel to generate new fault lines in the south, and the fragmented security architecture across the area all contribute to the persistence of risks,” Düz asserted.
The YPG’s insistence on maintaining self-styled autonomy in the northeast after the fall of the Assad regime in 2024 is viewed as the main obstacle to the March 2025 agreement.
A Türkiye with the vicinity of its borders cleared of terrorism is important, according to experts, especially amid lingering instability in the wider region.
“As border security strengthens, the ability of regional actors to gain ground through proxy warfare would diminish significantly,” Kaya said, underlining that the process is expected to reinforce Türkiye’s role as both a balancing power and a spoiler of destabilizing agendas.
