Days have passed since the U.S.-Israeli strikes started against Iran. From the perspective of the warring sides, it appears that the U.S. does not have a clear strategy. It has become more evident that Washington has followed Israel’s lead and that Trump was pushed into the war. Secretary of State Marco Rubio officially acknowledged this reality, stating that the U.S. was dragged into the conflict at Israel’s request.
Within the U.S. administration, there are contradictory statements regarding both the objectives and the justification of the war. Trump’s emphasis on “regime change” contrasts with Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s statement, “This is not a regime-change war,” revealing a lack of strategic coherence regarding the framework of the attack. Information leaked from the Pentagon further exposed disagreements among U.S. decision-makers, indicating that there was “no imminent Iranian threat to the United States.”
Not only does the U.S. lack a clear strategy for entering the war, but it also appears to lack an “exit strategy.” Washington is giving the impression that it has lost control of the conflict. It seems that the U.S. did not fully anticipate Iran’s capacity to retaliate or the extent to which the war could affect such a wide region. Moreover, it appears that it failed to foresee the global costs of Iran expanding the war across the region.
From the perspective of Israel and the U.S., the killing of Iran’s senior officials and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the initial strikes may be seen as operationally significant. From Iran’s standpoint, this is undoubtedly a profoundly destabilizing development. However, despite the loss of so many top officials, Iran quickly activated its constitutional “temporary leadership” mechanism. The system appears to be functioning in terms of institutional continuity. The “authority vacuum” that Israel may have expected has not emerged, at least for now. The Iranian military continues to strike predetermined targets.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the political leadership appear to be maintaining centralized control. The killing of the supreme leader seems to have created a “rally around the flag” effect. In this respect, no visible cracks have yet appeared within the elite leadership. From this angle, expectations of regime change do not appear realistic in the short term.
Iran is implementing a doctrine of “multilayered retaliation" and acting within the framework of an “existential war” concept. For this reason, it has not confined the conflict solely to Israel. Instead, it has focused on “externalizing and spreading the cost” through attacks on U.S. bases in the Gulf, maritime trade and the Strait of Hormuz. Iran seeks to increase both the regional and global costs of the war. It carried out attacks against all Gulf countries involved in mediation efforts, including Amman, thereby drawing the region into the conflict. Although Iran may believe these moves will restore deterrence and force the U.S. to step back, they have significantly damaged its regional legitimacy.
Because Iran expanded the war in a way that would cause greater damage to Gulf countries rather than targeting Israel directly, this development also serves Tel Aviv’s interests. The normalization process that had begun between Iran and Gulf countries before Oct. 7 will likely suffer a dramatic rupture after this war. In this context, Israel’s preference for a regional war from the outset must be understood through this lens. Accordingly, pushing regional countries entirely into the camp opposing Iran was precisely the outcome Israel desired. Iran’s decision to expand retaliation to include regional countries has been widely viewed as a mistake by both governments and societies in the region, including Türkiye.
Türkiye continues its diplomatic activism. It is maintaining intense diplomatic engagement with Iran, regional countries, the U.S., and Western governments alike, essentially speaking with all parties. Ankara is making considerable efforts to prevent the war from spreading, reduce its costs and return the parties to the negotiating table. At the same time, in the event that the war drags on, Türkiye is attempting to prepare for potential migration pressure, as well as the economic and energy security costs that may arise.
Since Iran has moved into an “existential war” framework, the likelihood of the conflict becoming prolonged is increasing. In the history of warfare, it is unprecedented for most of a country’s top leadership, including the religious leader, to be killed at the very outset of a conflict. This situation will make it more difficult for Iran to return to the negotiating table due to considerations of national pride. Because Khamenei was not only the leader of Iran but also a central figure in the Shiite world, the consequences of this war may have unexpected effects across a much wider geography.
