A few weeks ago, the European Commission launched its first strategic approach document for the Black Sea, promising a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub and a dedicated connectivity agenda. While this communique acknowledges the EU's commitment to a strategic region, it lacks two key elements for a successful strategy: adequate funding and directions for managing divergent strategic views with Türkiye.
Without secured funding, the EU's strategic approach for transforming the Black Sea region into a secure, prosperous and resilient hub in its vicinity will remain a collection of promises. For example, the strategy mentions the establishment of a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub to enhance maritime situational awareness and information sharing on the Black Sea, but it is unclear who will fund this hub. Will it be funded exclusively by the Black Sea states, which are part of the EU, or by the whole EU bloc?
Romania and Bulgaria, the riparian EU states, both have suboptimal naval capabilities. This is a direct result of decades of under-investment in defense and overreliance on vessels built under communist regimes. In terms of overall capacity, both navies are far behind the Turkish and Russian navies in the Black Sea. For example, Romania’s fleet strength has only two Type 22 frigates, one Mărășești-class frigate, four corvettes, various patrol vessels, and only one submarine. Bulgaria has one of the most limited naval capabilities in the Black Sea, with no operational submarines and a mix of Soviet-era vessels and an acquired Wielingen-class frigate. As a regional naval power, Türkiye has 16 frigates, eight corvettes and 13 submarines, including submarines with air-independent propulsion, and a drone-carrying amphibious assault ship commissioned in 2023.
Both Romania and Bulgaria have passed the NATO test of spending 2% of GDP on defense in 2024, but reaching the minimum threshold is insufficient given the security challenges the countries face, exacerbated since the start of Russia's full-scale war in Ukraine in 2022. Enabling a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub would imply that both these states, with help from EU institutions, rapidly increase their defense budgets and commit to sustained investment in their naval capabilities. For example, Romania’s new President Nicusor Dan recently announced he backs a U.S. proposal to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP, but it is unclear how he will do that, considering the country’s growing deficit.
The EU's strategy has another problem: it does not adequately address how the difference of vision regarding the Black Sea will be managed with NATO’s strongest ally in the region, Türkiye. The Turks have long been vocally against increasing NATO's military presence in the Black Sea. The Montreux Convention grants Türkiye absolute control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles, which Ankara closed to belligerent ships once war broke out in Ukraine in 2022. The Turkish government also blocked the straits for allies who could have engaged in military exercises, to prevent what Türkiye then portrayed as a potential escalation of the conflict. This treaty grants the Turks a great deal of power to direct the strategic destiny of the Black Sea and empowers them to oppose its internationalization.
Although there are differences of vision regarding the internationalization of the Black Sea, Türkiye is already cooperating with EU and NATO member states to ensure regional security. A recent example is the Bulgaria-Romania-Türkiye trilateral for demining the Black Sea, launched in 2024, which is also mentioned in the new EU strategy. This regional cooperation format should be scaled up through more information sharing and the development of common early warning capabilities in the Black Sea region. The EU can support the further development of this successful format in the future Black Sea Maritime Security Hub, where Turkish experts in maritime security should also be invited.
Under the current Erdoğan government, relations between the EU and Türkiye have hardened, which could jeopardize the implementation of the European strategy in the region. Without a fair partnership based on common interests with arguably the only power in the region that can stand up to Russia, the EU's dreams of imposing its strategic footprint on the Black Sea will remain mere aspirations.
In the recently launched communique, the commission mentions the need for a coordinated approach with Türkiye, but it fails to discuss how it wants to achieve this coordinated cooperation and which "sticks and carrots" they will use. As the number of Turkish citizens wishing to join the EU is on the rise, the acceleration of EU accession negotiations must be part of the commission's toolkit to achieve this unitary approach. Integrating Türkiye in the regional connectivity agenda by exploring common synergies between EU’s Global Gateway program and the Middle Corridor may also be part of this emerging toolkit, as well as incentivising joint ventures between like-minded nations in the region, where EU member states (Romania and Bulgaria), and EU candidate countries (Türkiye, Ukraine and Moldova) work together for achieving more interoperable capabilities.
An EU strategy for the Black Sea is necessary and urgent to ensure European security, all the more so in the context of the Russian hybrid threats, which have increased since 2022. While the commission's approach is welcome, without adequate funding and a serious plan to manage strategic differences with Türkiye, this strategy risks remaining a patchwork of promises.
